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The idea that “discovery” of unknown lands carried with it the right to 
assert sovereignty and claim ownership was widely used by European 
sovereigns during the age of modern colonialization to justify appropriating 
indigenous lands. Felix Cohen’s pioneering work in the 1940s on federal 
Indian law made discovery a matter of jurisprudential interest and 
highlighted its role in advancing the English colonial empire in what 
became the United States. Specifically, Cohen argued that the natural law 
right of discovery, as formulated by Spanish philosopher Francisco de 
Vitoria, helped facilitate the early European settlement of the American 
colonies and became a bedrock of federal Indian law. Today, legal scholars 
in the United States and elsewhere across the former British Empire view 
discovery as a discredited idea that contributed painfully to the 
displacement of indigenous peoples. That scholarship is incisive and 
valuable. Yet it contains a characteristic feature which exposes a serious 
flaw in Cohen’s work. The characteristic feature is the treatment of 
discovery as an idea manifested in a single “Doctrine of Discovery” 
purportedly accepted as a principle of international law influencing 
European adventurism beginning in Iberia during the Renaissance and 
continuing throughout the colonial era. The serious flaw is that this single 
doctrine of discovery thesis originated with Cohen and is mistaken. In this 
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paper, I question Cohen’s claims about the influence of Vitoria’s right of 
discovery on United States federal Indian law. More generally, I question 
the thesis that a single doctrine of discovery held sway for centuries in 
international law guiding European exploration and appropriation of 
indigenous lands. I argue that the history of jurisprudential thought and 
legal decision does not support the single discovery doctrine thesis. Rather, 
the idea of discovery appeared in a number of distinct theories favored by 
European powers in different ages and geopolitical contexts. I identify and 
distinguish four different discovery doctrines: (1) the medieval papal theory 
of discovery which helped spread Christianity across Europe and beyond 
beginning in the Middle Ages; (2) the natural law right of discovery begun 
by Vitoria in the 1530s and refined by later philosophers writing in the 
traditions of natural law and the law of nations; (3) the form the idea of 
discovery took with the United States Supreme Court early in the nineteenth 
century; and (4) the discovery theory of terra nullius employed by the 
British in settling Australia. I conclude that carefully distinguishing the 
different ideas of discovery is necessary to address and seek recompense for 
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During the era of European exploration and colonization of distant 
regions of the earth, the nations of Europe drew upon various religious, 
political, and legal justifications to appropriate indigenous lands. Among 
the most frequently invoked was the idea that “discovery” of unknown lands 
by a European sovereign carries with it the right to assert sovereignty and 
claim ownership. Today, this idea of discovery, for good reason, is widely 
discredited. Discovery was a notion fashioned by the powers of Europe to 
facilitate national expansion and territorial acquisition. In its various forms, 
it embraced European conceptions of both divine law and secular justice. 
Discovery was used to override and displace the norms, mores, belief 
systems, and dominion of the indigenous peoples the Europeans 
encountered in their worldwide expansion. Despite the sometimes lofty 
pretexts of bringing civilization to supposedly backwards peoples and 
cleansing their fraught souls, the idea of discovery was designed to 
aggrandize European cultures by justifying the expropriation of indigenous 
lands. 
Felix Cohen made the idea of discovery a matter of modern 
jurisprudential interest in his pioneering work on United States federal 
Indian law in the 1940s.1 Cohen identified the jurisprudential right of 
discovery formulated by the sixteenth century natural law philosopher 
Francisco de Vitoria as foundational to the early European settlement of 
what became the United States.2 By the late 1960s, Cohen’s insights began 
to influence scholars and activists in American Indian law. This led to a long 
overdue examination of how the idea of discovery had furthered the rise of 
the English colonial empire in the United States and elsewhere, including 
the displacement and subjugation of indigenous peoples. Legal scholars 
such as Vine Deloria, Jr.,3 David E. Wilkins,4 Robert A. Williams, Jr.,5 and 
 
 
1. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 1.02[1], at 8–14 (Nell Jessup 
Newton ed., 2012) (1941) [hereinafter COHEN’S HANDBOOK]; Felix S. Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 
MINN. L. REV. 28, 43–46 (1947); Felix S. Cohen, The Spanish Origin of Indian Rights in the Law of the 
United States, 31 GEO. L.J. 1, 9–21 (1942).  
2. See, e.g., COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 1.02[1], at 9–14; Cohen, Original Indian 
Title, supra note 1, at 43–46; Cohen, The Spanish Origin of Indian Rights in the Law of the United States, 
supra note 1, at 11–21. 
3. See, e.g., VINE DELORIA, JR. & DAVID E. WILKINS, TRIBES, TREATIES, AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBULATIONS 4–5, 81–85, 161 (1999); VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, 
AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN JUSTICE 2–6 (1983); VINE DELORIA, JR., BEHIND THE TRAIL OF 
BROKEN TREATIES 85–111 (1974). 
4. See DAVID E. WILKINS, AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 
31–35, 176–84 (1997). 
5. E.g., ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: 
THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST 229–31, 269–70 (1990). 











others6 drew attention to the role the notion of discovery played in the 
territorial dislocation of American Indians. Federal courts in the United 
States simultaneously began to reference it in tribal land claims cases.7 
Concurrently, interest in the idea of discovery arose in Australia and 
New Zealand. In New Zealand, many demanded to know how discovery 
had contributed to the diminution of Māori land rights. This resulted in the 
1975 legislative formation of the Waitangi Tribunal, a special judicial body 
created to consider claims of wrongful appropriation of Māori lands dating 
back to the nineteenth century.8 The specific discovery notion of terra 
nullius (land belonging to no one) likewise came under criticism in 
Australia, where it had served as the principle of English settlement. This 
culminated in the landmark 1992 Australian High Court decision, Mabo v 
Queensland, which decried the country’s historical reliance on terra 
nullius.9 
Recently, legal scholars from across the former British Empire have 
revived critical inquiry into the idea of discovery.10 Their work is powerful 
and incisive. Yet a characteristic feature of this current scholarship has laid 
bare a serious flaw in the work of Felix Cohen. The characteristic feature is 
the treatment of discovery as an idea manifested in a single “Doctrine of 
Discovery” said to have been accepted as a principle of international law 
influencing European adventurism for centuries, beginning in the 1400s in 
Iberia and continuing throughout the age of modern colonialism.11 The 
 
 
6. See, e.g., FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS: AMERICAN INDIAN LAW AND 
CONTEMPORARY TRIBAL LIFE 123–26 (1995); PETRA T. SHATTUCK & JILL NORGREN, PARTIAL 
JUSTICE: FEDERAL INDIAN LAW IN A LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM 31–38 (1991). 
7. See, e.g., Catawba Indian Tribe of S.C. v. South Carolina, 865 F.2d 1444, 1451 (4th Cir. 
1989); Mohegan Tribe v. Connecticut, 638 F.2d 612, 616–17 (2d Cir. 1981); Cherokee Nation or Tribe 
of Indians v. Oklahoma, 402 F.2d 739, 745 (10th Cir. 1968); Sac & Fox Tribe of Indians of Okla. v. 
United States, 383 F.2d 991, 997–98 (Ct. Cl. 1967). 
8. See GISELLE BYRNES, THE WAITANGI TRIBUNAL AND NEW ZEALAND HISTORY (2004); 
THE WAITANGI TRIBUNAL: TE ROOPU WHAKAMANA I TE TIRITI O WAITANGI (Janine Hayward & Nicola 
R. Wheen eds., 2004); Jacinta Ruru, The Waitangi Tribunal, in WEEPING WATERS: THE TREATY OF 
WAITANGI AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 127 (Malcolm Mulholland & Veronica Tawhai eds., 2010). 
9. See Mabo v Queensland [No 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1 (Austl.). 
10. See, e.g., DISCOVERING INDIGENOUS LANDS: THE DOCTRINE OF DISCOVERY IN THE 
ENGLISH COLONIES (Robert J. Miller, Jacinta Ruru, Larissa Behrendt, & Tracey Lindberg eds., 2010) 
(collection of essays on the effect of discovery in the settlement of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and 
the United States); LINDSAY G. ROBERTSON, CONQUEST BY LAW: HOW THE DISCOVERY OF AMERICA 
DISPOSSESSED INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OF THEIR LANDS 75–80, 96–105, 111–44 (2005) (discussing how 
the idea of discovery helped facilitate European appropriation of American Indian lands); BLAKE A. 
WATSON, BUYING AMERICA FROM THE INDIANS: JOHNSON V. MCINTOSH AND THE HISTORY OF NATIVE 
LAND RIGHTS 322–58 (2012) (examining the impact of the idea of discovery in the exploration and 
settlement of the United States). 
11. See, e.g., Larissa Behrendt, The Doctrine of Discovery in Australia, in DISCOVERING 
INDIGENOUS LANDS, supra note 10, at 171 (maintaining that in settling the Australian continent, the 
British chose to exercise the discovery precept of terra nullius); Larissa Behrendt, Asserting the Doctrine 












serious flaw is that this ‘single doctrine of discovery thesis’ originated with 
Cohen and is mistaken. 
Cohen’s studies and advocacy in federal Indian law were 
groundbreaking. He deserves esteem. He represented tribal interests before 
the United States Supreme Court,12 helped draft the Indian Reorganization 
Act of 1934,13 and greatly influenced the development of federal Indian law 
as a distinct field of legal study.14 One of his signature contributions was 
“[t]o show that the basic principles of the law of the United States relating 
to Indian rights were derived from Spanish sources.”15 He gave special 
prominence to the work of the Salamancan jurist Francisco de Vitoria. 
Cohen argued first, that federal Indian law originated and is best understood 
in the context of international law, and second, that the basic concepts of 
international law addressing European discovery of indigenous lands and 
peoples “were all hammered out by the Spanish theological jurists of the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, most notably . . . Francisco de 
Vitoria.”16 Cohen went on to say: 
 
 
Macklem, What is International Human Rights Law? Three Applications of a Distributive Account, 52 
MCGILL L.J. 575, 591 (2007) (arguing that early international law recognized a doctrine of discovery 
containing several precepts); Robert J. Miller, The Doctrine of Discovery, in DISCOVERING INDIGENOUS 
LANDS, supra note 10, at 1 (defining a Doctrine of Discovery with ten elements and detailing its 
development in Europe and impact in North America and elsewhere); Robert J. Miller & Jacinta Ruru, 
An Indigenous Lens into Comparative Law: The Doctrine of Discovery in the United States and New 
Zealand, 111 W. VA. L. REV. 849 (2009) (same); ROBERT J. MILLER, NATIVE AMERICA, DISCOVERED 
AND CONQUERED: THOMAS JEFFERSON, LEWIS AND CLARK, AND MANIFEST DESTINY 9–23 (Univ. of 
Neb. Press 2008) (2006) (same); Jacinta Ruru, The Still Permeating Influence of the Doctrine of 
Discovery in Aotearoa/New Zealand: 1970s–2000s, in DISCOVERING INDIGENOUS LANDS, supra note 
10, at 227 (expressly extending Miller’s conception of a ten-element doctrine of discovery to the British 
settlement of New Zealand); Jacinta Ruru, Concluding Comparatively: Discovery in the English 
Colonies, in DISCOVERING INDIGENOUS LANDS, supra note 10, at 247 (same); WATSON, supra note 10, 
at 349 (referring to terra nullius as “the most extreme version of [the] doctrine of discovery,” which is 
also taken to include the concept of discovery followed by the United States Supreme Court in its 
formative cases on federal Indian law).  
12. See United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339 (1941). 
13. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461–479 (2012). 
14. See Neil Jessup Newton et. al., Forward to COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at vii, 
which highlights the significance of Cohen’s Handbook by noting that prior to its first publication in 
1941, “lawyers and courts regarded federal Indian law as a collection of loosely connected, tribally 
specific treaties, statutes, case decisions, and other sources. Felix Cohen’s Handbook brought focus and 
coherence to this confusing welter of sources and, in effect, created the field of federal Indian law.” Id. 
15. Cohen, The Spanish Origin of Indian Rights in the Law of the United States, supra note 1, 
at 16. See also COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 1.02[1], at 11 (stating that “many principles of 
Spanish jurisprudence found their way into early American Indian law”); Cohen, Original Indian Title, 
supra note 1, at 43–44 (“[American] concepts of Indian title derive only in part from common law feudal 
concepts. In the main, they are to be traced to Spanish origins.”). 
16. Cohen, The Spanish Origin of Indian Rights in the Law of the United States, supra note 1, 
at 17. Accord COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 1.02[1], at 9 (maintaining that Vitoria’s writings 
“formed the foundation of both international law and modern Indian law”); Cohen, Original Indian Title, 
supra note 1, at 44 (identifying Vitoria works as the principal influence on the American concept of 
Indian land title). 











While Vitoria himself is not directly cited in any of the early opinions 
of the United States Supreme Court on Indian cases, these opinions 
frequently refer to statements by Grotius and Vattel that are either 
copied or adapted from the words of Vitoria. It is thus clear that the 
tradition of legal teaching carried Vitoria’s theories on Indian rights 
to the judges and attorneys who formulated our legal doctrine in this 
field.17      
This statement oversimplifies the highly complex idea of discovery. That 
idea never denoted a singular concept or an enduring and unchanging 
jurisprudential notion. Rather, it evolved and took distinctly different 
doctrinal forms over the centuries. Vitoria crafted the natural law right of 
discovery in the 1530s.18 Other legal philosophers, including Hugo Grotius 
and Emer de Vattel, advanced the idea of discovery in subsequent centuries. 
Yet they hardly just “copied or adapted from the words of Vitoria,” as 
Cohen claimed.19 Vattel in particular conceived of the right of discovery in 
a manner that directly contradicted Vitoria. Moreover, none of the early 
opinions of the United States Supreme Court, including the famous set of 
cases known as the Marshall trilogy,20 carried Vitoria’s right of discovery 
forward “to the judges and attorneys who formulated our legal doctrine in 
this field” of federal Indian law.21 The idea of discovery adopted by the 
Supreme Court was not Vitoria’s. 
In this paper, I question Cohen’s claim about Vitoria’s influence. More 
generally, I question the thesis that a single doctrine of discovery held sway 
for centuries in international law, guiding the European exploration and 
expropriation of indigenous lands. I ask whether the history of 
jurisprudential thought and legal decision supports the single discovery 
doctrine thesis, or if the idea of discovery instead was manifested in 
philosophically distinct theories favored by European powers in different 
ages and geopolitical contexts to expropriate newly ‘discovered’ lands. The 
jurisprudential record supports the distinct theory thesis, revealing four 
different discovery doctrines. 
In Parts I–IV, I discuss the four discovery doctrines in historical 
sequence. Part I considers the earliest doctrine, the medieval papal theory 
 
 
17. Cohen, The Spanish Origin of Indian Rights in the Law of the United States, supra note 1, 
at 17. Accord COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 1.02, at 11. 
18. See infra text accompanying notes 84–119. 
19. See Cohen, The Spanish Origin of Indian Rights in the Law of the United States, supra 
note 1, at 17. 
20. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 
U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). 
21. See Cohen, The Spanish Origin of Indian Rights in the Law of the United States, supra 












of discovery. Developed by the papacy and employed in consort with 
Catholic monarchs, this theory helped facilitate the spread of Christianity 
across Europe and beyond beginning in the Middle Ages. Part II examines 
the natural law right of discovery. First formulated by Vitoria in the 1530s 
and subsequently refined by later philosophers writing in the traditions of 
natural law and the law of nations, this jurisprudential right of discovery 
influenced European adventurism until the nineteenth century. Part III 
analyzes the form the doctrine of discovery took in the United States 
Supreme Court during the nineteenth century, beginning with the Marshall 
trilogy. Part IV examines the theory of terra nullius employed by the British 
in settling Australia. Finally, I consider the effects of the single doctrine of 
discovery thesis. I conclude that by failing to carefully distinguish the 
different ideas of discovery, the thesis misrepresents jurisprudential history, 
generates needless theoretical confusion, and undermines future efforts to 
rectify past injustices. 
I. PAPAL THEORY OF DISCOVERY 
A. In General 
The idea that “discovery” of unknown lands gives to the discoverer the 
right to claim and assert sovereign ownership began to appear in Western 
culture as early as fifth century Rome. Historians trace it to the Roman 
Catholic Church and the efforts of early popes to assert worldwide papal 
jurisdiction.22 The form discovery took under the enterprising resolve of the 
medieval Church is best understood as a close analog to what is known as 
the principle of terra nullius.  
In pursuit of its self-proclaimed global calling to cure the spiritual health 
of all persons, the early Catholic Church considered itself justified to 
intervene in the secular affairs of nonbelievers. Intervention extended to all 
infidels who offended Church-sanctioned precepts of divine and natural 
law. Foremost among those precepts was the obligation to abide by the will 
and commands of the Christian God. Purportedly for the heathens’ own 
sakes, the Church claimed an obligation to undertake the burden of 
conversion by spreading the gospel’s redemptive word.23 The Church 
promised salvation and eternal life. To achieve that beneficial end, it 
collaborated with European nobility to conquer and subdue whole 
populations of the unenlightened. Submission often required repressing 
 
 
22. See, e.g., ANTHONY PAGDEN, LORDS OF ALL THE WORLD: IDEOLOGIES OF EMPIRE IN 
SPAIN, BRITAIN, AND FRANCE C. 1500–C. 1800 24–31 (1995); WILLIAMS, supra note 5, at 13–18. 
23. See, e.g., PAGDEN, supra note 22, at 24–31. 











freedom, even to the point of enslavement. It also justified diminishing the 
dominium of nonbelievers, appropriating their lands, and compromising 
their sovereignty.24 
A prime example of church/crown collaboration is the bull Laudabiliter, 
issued by Pope Adrian IV in 1155. The bull directly addressed King Henry 
II of England who was contemplating an invasion of Ireland. Adrian used 
the bull to grant Henry the island’s possession in advance. The bestowal 
was made “to enlarge the boundaries of the Church, to teach rude and 
ignorant peoples the truth of the Christian faith and to stamp out the plants 
of evil from the field of the Lord.”25 The pope further proclaimed to Henry: 
You have signified to us, most beloved son in Christ, your desire to 
enter the island of Ireland in order to subject the people of it to laws 
and to extirpate the vices which have taken root there; and also your 
willingness to pay an annual pension to St. Peter of one penny from 
every house . . . . We, therefore, . . . consider it as accepted and agreed 
that you should enter that island in order to extend the boundaries of 
the Church, to restrain the downward course of vice, to correct morals 
and implant virtues, to advance the Christian religion and to execute 
there everything which tends to the honour of God and to the 
salvation of the land.26 
Through such strategic collaborations between the Church and European 
powers, heathen lands fell subject to appropriation under the rough-hewn 
fiction that, as a matter of law, they belonged to no one—terra nullius in 
inchoate form. The medieval papal and political authorities of course knew 
that the lands of non-Christian infidels were occupied. The very justification 
for expropriation presumed as much. The presence of nonbelievers gave 
cause for confiscation. Self-burdened with responsibility to spread the 
gospel to all infidels wherever found, the Church treated confiscation of 
heathen lands by its political partners as part and parcel of its redemptive 
mission. To say that the papal theory of discovery was closely analogous to 
the principle of terra nullius thus does not mean that the idea of discovery 
operative in medieval Christian Europe authorized the appropriation of land 
actually belonging to no one. ‘No one’ meant no Christian, or no one but 
infidels. The principle was terra infidelibus (‘land belonging to infidels’). 
 
 
24. See id. at 24–35. 
25. Bull “Laudabiliter” of Pope Adrian IV Sanctioning the Conquest of Ireland by Henry II, 
King of England (1155), in CHURCH AND STATE THROUGH THE CENTURIES: A COLLECTION OF 
HISTORIC DOCUMENTS WITH COMMENTARIES 53, 54 (Sidney Z. Ehler & John B. Morrall eds. & trans., 
Biblo & Tannen 1967). 












This incipient discovery idea authorized the expropriation of lands 
belonging to non-Christian peoples that were ‘discovered’ by European 
expansionists acting under authority of Christian rulers in partnership with 
the Catholic Church. 
B. The Question of Infidel Rights 
For several centuries, terra infidelibus worked its influence as a 
practical, religio-political idea. It helped facilitate the Catholic Church’s 
expansion across Europe during the Early and High Middle Ages. It also 
accommodated the political ambitions of Christian rulers. By the mid-
thirteenth century, however, the idea that discovery of unknown lands could 
give Christian rulers legitimate authority to subdue non-Christians and 
confiscate their lands came under pressure from the dawning sentiment that 
infidels may have rights worthy of legal protection. Central to the 
emergence of this sentiment was a brilliant canon lawyer, Sinibaldo Fieschi, 
better remembered as Pope Innocent IV (1243-1254).27 
Prior to Innocent, the rights of non-Christians had received relatively 
little consideration from canonists. The first collection of canon laws, 
Gratian’s Decretum (c. 1140), paid almost no attention to nonbelievers.28 
The second volume of canon law, Pope Gregory IX’s Decretals, published 
nearly a century later in 1234, included a limited number of canons 
addressing the personal and social relations between Christians and non-
Christians in Europe.29 Not until the papacy of Innocent did the question of 
whether Christians have a general right to seize the lands of infidels become 
a subject of study in canonist thought. His Commentaria doctissima in 
Quinque Libros Decretalium (1245)30 addressed the question directly. 
Heavily influenced by Aristotelian philosophy and drawing authority 
from both Roman law and Biblical passages, Innocent argued that 
Christians do not have an unqualified right to seize the lands of infidels.31 
Innocent thought this position followed necessarily from natural law. For 
while all property was originally held in common, the light of natural 
reason, as informed by worldly affairs, revealed the social utility of private 
 
 
27. See JAMES MULDOON, POPES, LAWYERS AND INFIDELS 29 (Edward Peters ed., 1979). 
28. See CORPUS IURIS CANONICI: VOL. I, DECRETUM (Emil Friedberg ed., Bernard Tauchnitz 
1879–81) (c. 1140). 
29. CORPUS IURIS CANONICI: VOL. II, DECRETALES (Emil Friedberg ed., Bernard Tauchnitz 
1879–81) (1234). 
30. INNOCENT IV, COMMENTARIA DOCTISSIMA IN QUINQUE LIBROS DECRETALIUM (Apud 
haeredes Nicolai Beuilaquae, 1581) (1245). 
31. Id. at 3.34.8., fol. 176v. 











property.32 Hence, the natural right of dominium became a secondary 
precept of natural law.33 Innocent conceived of it as a right that extended to 
all people, independent of spiritual standing. Accordingly, the law of nature 
qualified the Church’s power over infidel lands. The Church could not 
deprive heathens of their lands simply on the ground that they were 
nonbelievers. Seizure was lawful only when predicated on specific, just 
cause.34 
Innocent did not, however, question or qualify the pope’s responsibility 
to secure the salvation of all souls, Christian and heathen alike. He affirmed 
that this pastoral responsibility was absolute and universal. As such, the 
pope’s redemptive obligations and temporal jurisdiction extended across the 
entire world, though as to infidels the jurisdiction was de jure only, not de 
facto.35 Innocent argued that so long as infidels abided by the precepts of 
natural law and welcomed peaceful Christian missionaries, the Church did 
not have just cause to deprive them of their lands or interfere with their self-
governance.36  However, the papacy could authorize the invasion and 
conquest of heathen societies when necessary to enforce the dictates of 
natural law or secure safe entry for missionaries.37 
Pope Innocent IV thus importantly qualified the theory of terra 
infidelibus. Medievalists consider his conviction that infidels can possess 
dominium to be a principal legacy of his papacy and one of his most 
significant contributions to canonical thought.38 This concession to the 
rights of infidels should not be taken as a weakening of papal power, 
however. For Innocent asserted as forcefully as any pontiff before him the 
Church’s universal jurisdiction. He assumed absolute responsibility for the 
spiritual well-being of all people.39 To fulfill this responsibility, he issued 
formal restrictions on European Jews and Muslims to protect Christians 
from spiritual and bodily injury.40 He ordered that the Talmud be burned to 
shield Jews from false teachings.41 And he authorized indulgences for 
crusades to the Holy Land and to Muslim-controlled regions of Spain.42 His 
 
 
32. See id. 
33. See id. Accord THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE I. q. 94 art. 5 (Fathers of the 
English Dominican Province trans., Benzinger Bros. 1948). 
34. See INNOCENT IV, supra note 30, at 3.34.8., fol. 176v. 
35. See id. (“Papa super omnes habet iurisdictionem. et potestatem de iure, licet non de 
facto.”). 
36. See id. 
37. See id. 
38. See MULDOON, supra note 27, at 29–30, 47. 
39. See id. at 45; WILLIAMS, supra note 5, at 13–14. 
40. See MULDOON, supra note 27, at 45. 
41. See id. 












commentary on Pope Innocent III’s decretal Quod super his proclaimed the 
Church’s unqualified power to authorize the invasion of heathen lands by 
Christian armies to spread the gospel and convert nonbelievers.43 Infidels 
could possess dominium, but spiritual redemption provided ample just cause 
for overriding that natural right. All told, the first half of the thirteenth 
century, which included Innocent’s pontificate, was the high point of the 
Roman Catholic Church’s power and political influence.44 Innocent’s death 
in 1254 marked the beginning of its decline.45 
Debate within the Church and among canon and civil lawyers over the 
rights of infidels to lordship and property, as well as over the scope of the 
Church’s power and jurisdiction continued for over a century and a half after 
Innocent. Some notable figures, such as the early natural law philosopher 
Giovanni de Legnano, continued Innocent’s line of reasoning. Legnano’s 
principal work, the Tractatus De Bello, De Represaliis et De Duello, written 
in 1360, remains significant today as the first formal work on the theory of 
just war.46 In examining the question of who could rightfully declare war, 
Legnano followed Innocent in affirming the rights of non-Christians to 
govern themselves and possess property.47  
Other canon and civil lawyers rebutted Innocent. His own student, Henry 
of Segusio, widely known as Hostiensis, published an influential argument 
against his teacher shortly after Innocent’s death.48 To Hostiensis, Christ 
and the Roman pontiffs held unqualified jurisdiction over all spiritual and 
temporal affairs worldwide.49 When Christ became incarnate, nonbelievers 
lost their natural rights to property and lordship; hence, the pope could take 
their lands and expunge their sovereignty at will, since they were usurpers 
of all lands and offices they occupied.50 Similar sentiments came from the 
early fourteenth century Italian jurist Oldratus de Ponte. Focusing strictly 
on infidels living in Europe, Oldratus argued that the birth of Christ 
irrevocably altered the content of natural law.51 According to Oldratus, the 
Nativity signified that all people were created to worship the Christian God. 
While the rights to property and self-governance previously had been 
universal, those who refused to accept Christ forfeited those rights. Further, 
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Oldratus insisted nonbelievers were not wronged by Christians who seized 
their property or crushed their sovereignty, for such temporal losses might 
lead them to faith and ultimately salvation.52 
This debate over the rights of infidels and the Church’s power to 
expropriate under the theory of terra infidelibus reached a formal, though 
frail, resolution early in the fifteenth century. Conflict between the Kingdom 
of Poland and the crusading Teutonic Knights over pagan Lithuania 
provided the stimulus. The Poles and the Knights had long asserted 
competing claims and skirmished over Lithuania.53 Both based their claims 
on papal authority. The conflict wore on for over a century with neither 
faction gaining lasting political advantage. This was due in no small part to 
the refractory Lithuanians’ persistent desire for self-determination. Finally, 
in 1386, Poland and Lithuania reached an accord and formed a political 
alliance.54 Their combined might led to a suffering defeat of the Teutonic 
Knights in 1410.55 The need for diplomacy was still fresh when the 
ecumenical council known as the Council of Constance convened in 1414. 
There, the Church and secular Christian rulers, along with the Teutonic 
Knights, adopted a formal doctrine of cooperation regarding their 
adventures in heathen lands.56 The doctrine expressly affirmed Innocent’s 
position on the rights of infidels, as they agreed not to intervene in the 
governance and affairs of non-Christians who complied with the Church-
sanctioned dictates of natural law.57  
Growing out of the conflict over Lithuania, the understanding of terra 
infidelibus agreed to at the Council of Constance was conceived with 
European infidels in mind. It put to rest the debate over the rights of 
nonbelievers that had simmered since the mid-thirteenth century. Innocent’s 
views on the natural right of infidels to possess property and exercise 
sovereignty prevailed; Hostiensis’ argument that natural rights depend upon 
divine grace was repudiated. It soon became clear, however, that the clarity 
regarding the rights of non-Christians provided by the Council of Constance 
did not carry over to the exploits of Christian European rulers acting beyond 
the boundaries of Europe.  
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C. The Fifteenth Century Bulls of Donation 
Just two decades after the Council of Constance, Pope Eugenius IV 
issued a papal bull, the Romanus Pontifex (1436). The bull’s principal 
purpose was to settle a dispute between Portugal and Castile by awarding 
the Canary Islands to Portugal.58 The kings of Portugal and Castile had each 
laid claim to the Canaries. Both based their claims on discovery. Uncertain 
at first how to resolve competing claims by two Catholic monarchs, 
Eugenius banned all Christians from engaging with the islands in 1434.59 
King Duarte of Portugal protested. In a long letter to the pope prophesying 
the inevitable European conquest of the West African island chain, Duarte 
assured Eugenius that the Portuguese interest in the islands rested foremost 
in converting the native Gauches people to Christianity. He noted that his 
brother, Prince Henry the Navigator, had already begun significant 
missionary work among them. As to the rights of the Gauches to dominium, 
Duarte’s letter largely fell silent. He was careful not to contradict Innocent’s 
line of argument regarding the rights of infidels. Yet he did not encourage 
respect for the Gauches. He described them as fierce and primitive, as 
“nearly wild men . . . lacking in normal social intercourse, living in the 
country like animals.”60 The Portuguese would bring them civil laws, 
organized government, and the blessings of Christian baptism.61 The 
implication was that little concern needed to be given to the Gauches’ 
interests in dominium, for depriving them of their earthly holdings was far 
outweighed by the spiritual rewards they could receive. After first securing 
legal advice on the rights of infidels from two prominent canon lawyers,62 
Eugenius issued the Romanus Pontifex. With it, he authorized Portugal to 
assert managerial control over the Canaries on behalf of the Church, on the 
condition that it convert the Gauches to Christianity.63  
Subsequent popes reissued the Romanus Pontifex. Additional papal bulls 
on discovery and conquest followed later in the fifteenth century. Each bull 
augmented the powers of the Church and the Christian rulers, further 
reinvigorating the longstanding principle of terra infidelibus. Most of the 
edicts inured to the benefit of Portugal for its escapades along the west coast 
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of Africa. Among the most wide-ranging and generous was the version of 
the Romanus Pontifex issued by Pope Nicholas V in 1455. This bull noted 
that the earlier Romanus Pontifex and other papal letters had granted the 
Portuguese “full and free permission . . . to invade, search out, capture, 
conquer and subjugate all Saracens and pagans whatsoever and wherever 
they exist, together with their kingdoms, duchies, principalities, lordships, 
possessions and whatever goods . . . and to bring their persons into perpetual 
slavery . . . .”64 It further stipulated: 
[T]he aforesaid letters of permission . . . are to be extended . . . to the 
above-mentioned [regions along the west coast of Africa] and any 
other acquisitions whatsoever, even if acquired before the date of the 
aforesaid letters of permission, and to those provinces, islands, ports 
and seas, whatever they may be, which henceforth in the name of the 
said King Alfonso [of Portugal] and his successors  . . . may be 
acquired from the hands of the infidels or pagans in those and the 
adjoining regions and in the further and more remote areas. We also 
decree that . . . the territories already acquired and those which shall 
happen to be acquired in the future . . . for ever do belong and pertain 
“de iure” to the same King Alfonso and his successors . . . .65 
Starting with the first Romanus Pontifex, the principal effect of the 
fifteenth century series of papal bulls on discovery was to reserve land for 
Portugal. Well aware that the bulls earmarked West Africa for Portugal’s 
expansionist exploits, Spain’s Catholic monarchs began to look westward. 
With the blessing of King Ferdinand of Aragon and Queen Isabella of 
Castile, Christopher Columbus sailed to the West Indies in 1492. Promptly 
after Columbus’ return to Iberia, King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella sought 
papal recognition of Spanish title to the islands Columbus ‘discovered.’ 
Pope Alexander VI quickly confirmed Spain’s title. On consecutive days in 
May 1493, he issued two bulls, each beginning with the words Inter caetera 
Divinae.66 The second, issued May 4, 1493, carried more importance. It 
granted title to the claimed islands to Spain. Further, it included language 
clarifying how the discovery rights it extended to Spain fit with those earlier 
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promised to Portugal by the series of donative bulls beginning with the first 
Romanus Pontifex.67 
Inter caetera II began by declaring the Caribbean islands in question to 
be Spanish possessions since they were “actually discovered” by Columbus 
and had “not been found by any one else before.”68 The bull further granted 
Spain title to whatever other lands it may subsequently discover, provided 
they were not already “actually possessed by some other Christian king or 
prince.”69 Next, the bull stipulated a longitudinal line from the North Pole 
to the South Pole, bisecting the Atlantic Ocean. Spain was given discovery 
rights over all lands to the line’s west (nearly all of the New World), 
Portugal to the east (all of Africa and the East Indies).70 A year later, in 
1494, Portugal and Spain entered into the Treaty of Tordesillas.71 The treaty 
moved the line of donative demarcation further west, far enough for 
Portugal to explore and colonize much of what later became Brazil.72 By 
virtue of the bulls from the first Romanus Pontifex to Inter caetera II, as 
modified by the Treaty of Tordesillas, Portugal and Spain thus could 
explore, subdue, and assert dominion over all non-Christian peoples and 
lands worldwide, on behalf of and in the name of Christendom.73 
With this, the papal idea of discovery, in the sense of terra infidelibus, 
began to influence the Americas.74 Historians correctly note that the form 
the idea took as the fifteenth century drew to a close consisted of four key 
points. As described by Robert J. Miller, the doctrine established that: 
1. the Church had the political and secular authority to grant Christian 
kings a form of title and ownership in the lands of infidels; 2. 
European exploration and colonization was designed to exercise the 
Church’s guardianship duties over all the earthly flock, including 
infidels; 3. Spain and Portugal held exclusive rights over other 
European, Christian countries to explore and colonize the entire 
world; and 4. the mere sighting and discovery of new lands by Spain 
or Portugal in their respective spheres of influence and the symbolic 
possession of these lands by undertaking the rituals and formalities 
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of possession, such as planting flags or leaving objects to prove their 
presence, were sufficient to create rights in these lands.75 
Notably absent from this list is the universal natural right to dominium 
that Pope Innocent IV introduced to the idea of discovery in the mid-1200s. 
The Council of Constance endorsed Innocent’s line of thinking in 1418.76 
Yet as the fifteenth century wore on and European dreams of adventure and 
conquest turned resolutely beyond the continent, mention of natural rights 
of non-Christians fell away. The bulls of donation to Portugal and Spain 
from the first Romanus Pontifex through Inter caetera II all deftly 
sidestepped any reference to the rights of infidels. The lawyers who drafted 
those letters of donation were careful to avoid direct mention of natural 
rights so as not to inconvenience the papacy’s assumed power to bestow 
dominium over the entire world outside Europe.77 The discovery doctrine 
of terra infidelibus could countenance natural rights for European pagans 
like the Lithuanians, but the indigenous others the Europeans began to 
encounter in Africa, Asia, and the Americas were just too different. 
II. NATURAL LAW RIGHT OF DISCOVERY 
A. Political Opposition to Terra Infidelibus 
The medieval papacy’s conception of discovery substantially influenced 
the exploration and colonization of Latin America. To a large extent, the 
church/state partnership it embraced shaped the colonial adventures of 
Portugal and Spain until the late eighteenth century.78 However, the papal 
theory only nominally impacted the imperial exploits of other European 
nations. Two forces, one political, the other philosophical, worked against 
it. 
Politically, the papal doctrine quickly drew opposition from Christian 
European monarchies other than its two donative beneficiaries. By the mid-
sixteenth century, England, France, and other European nations began to 
contest the practice, common to Spain and Portugal, of establishing 
territorial claims by performing rituals or even just sighting land.79 These 
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European nations also argued that the pope did not have authority to parcel 
the entire ‘undiscovered’ world to the Spanish and Portuguese.80 Columbus’ 
voyages to the West Indies, along with other European maritime adventures, 
such as Vasco da Gama’s discovery of a sea route to India in 1498 and 
Ferdinand Magellan’s circumnavigation of the earth from 1519 to 1522, left 
Europeans convinced that there was substantial land unknown to them lying 
beyond their continent.81 They hungered for adventure and conquest. The 
idea that the papacy could bequeath this untold abundance to only Portugal 
and Spain offended other European nations. Those like England, with a 
strained relationship with the Catholic Church, readily dismissed papal 
assertions of donative power.82 Yet even a staunch Roman Catholic country 
like France largely disregarded the bulls of donation even though the French 
did not question the Church’s claim to universal ecclesiastical jurisdiction.83 
This widespread opposition to Portugal and Spain’s favored-nation status in 
the letters of donation significantly eroded the authority of the papal 
discovery doctrine well before the European age of discovery began in 
earnest. However, the opposition focused almost entirely on the pope’s 
donative authority. As a rule, European monarchs did not challenge the 
presumption at the heart of terra infidelibus that the lands of distant foreign 
infidels were ripe for Europeans to explore and colonize, with little need to 
consider the rights of the indigenous others.  
B. Francisco de Vitoria 
The papal discovery doctrine fell subject to broader, more trenchant 
criticism in the realm of philosophy than in the political arena. Early in the 
sixteenth century, disaffection emerged within Spanish religious and legal 
communities over the legitimacy of Spain’s claims to dominion in the New 
World. King Charles V responded by convening a group of legal scholars, 
including the influential natural law philosopher, Francisco de Vitoria. In 
1535, Vitoria presented a set of lectures, De Indis (On the American 
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Indians).84 Significantly, Vitoria rejected the assertion of unqualified papal 
or royal authority to parcel indigenous lands, including on discovery.85  
Vitoria reasoned that the indigenous peoples of the Americas could not 
be displaced and dispossessed of their lands simply on the ground that they 
were Christian heretics. Appropriation of their lands on that ground alone 
amounted to robbery.86 The conclusion clearly holds, Vitoria wrote, “that 
before arrival of the Spaniards these barbarians possessed true dominion, 
both in public and private affairs.”87 He argued that their dominion was no 
less legitimate than that of Christians.88 Further, neither king nor pope could 
nullify that dominion at will. For by natural law, all people are free and no 
one is master of the whole world.89 While human law has introduced 
temporal supremacy, “no one can be emperor of the world by natural law.”90 
Hence, any Spanish claims to ownership over tribal lands in the Americas 
based solely on papal or monarchical authority led to an illegitimate and 
unjust title.91 This was true, Vitoria continued, even though by natural law 
and the law of nations derived from it, property and lands that belong to no 
one—i.e., terra nullius—pass to the first discoverer or occupier.92 For the 
lands of the New World were not terra nullius. They had indigenous 
owners. Hence, their ‘discovery’ by the Spanish “of itself provides no 
support for possession of these lands, any more than it would if they had 
discovered us.”93 
Vitoria did allow, though, that discovery could lead to a just title if 
connected with other considerations.94 He observed that by natural law and 
the law of nations, all people have rights to travel and engage in fair trade.95 
“[S]o long as they do no harm” to the people or their homelands, Vitoria 
reasoned that the Spaniards have the right to travel and live in the Americas, 
and the right to trade lawfully among its indigenous inhabitants.96 If the 
Indians were to abridge these natural rights that belong to all, then discovery 
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would give a European ruler a limited right to interfere with their 
dominion.97  
Further, Vitoria combined the rights to travel and engage in commerce 
with the natural law condition of common property. He reasoned that, “if 
there are any things among the barbarians which are held in common both 
by their own people and by strangers, it is not lawful for the barbarians to 
prohibit the Spaniards from sharing and enjoying them.”98 Hence, any lands 
or water resources treated by the American Indians as common property had 
to be shared communally with the Spaniards. The rights of the discoverers 
to shared use of such common property was conditioned, however, by the 
traditions of the Indians. Vitoria argued that Europeans “are only allowed 
to do this kind of thing [i.e., use and draw resources from common property] 
on the same terms as the [Indians], namely without causing offence to the 
native inhabitants and citizens.”99 According to Vitoria, this limited right to 
use common resources directly followed from the rights to travel and trade, 
as protected by natural law. He wrote that “proof of this follows from the 
first [right to travel] and second [right to trade] propositions. If the 
Spaniards are allowed to travel and trade among the barbarians, they are 
allowed to make use of the legal privileges and advantages conceded to all 
travelers.”100 
Vitoria also argued that the Spanish could acquire just title to occupied 
lands in the Americas if the indigenous inhabitants were to obstruct them 
from spreading word about the Christian religion.101 All Christians, he 
maintained, have a natural right to preach the gospel in the lands of 
nonbelievers.102 This right held special prominence for the pope, since his 
“special business [is] to promote the Gospel throughout the world.”103 
Though Vitoria denied that the pope had jurisdiction over temporal affairs, 
he insisted that the Roman pontiff “has power in temporal things insofar as 
they concern spiritual things.”104 Hence, the pope could not only delegate 
and “restrict . . . the right to preach, but also the right to trade, if this is 
convenient for the spreading of the Christian religion.”105 In this way, the 
grants to Spain and Portugal in the fifteenth century bulls of donation fell 
within the authority of the papacy. Indigenous Americans who obstructed 
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the Spaniards from proclaiming the message of Christian redemption 
infringed the Spaniards’ natural right to preach the gospel. Such 
infringement gave the Spaniards just cause to declare war on them and 
appropriate their land.106 Yet Vitoria insisted there must be genuine 
obstruction. For “if the barbarians permit the Spaniards to preach the Gospel 
freely and without hindrance, then whether or not they accept the faith, it 
will not be lawful to attempt to impose anything on them by war, or 
otherwise conquer their lands.”107 
This right of discovery fashioned by Vitoria differed importantly from 
the papal theory of terra infidelibus. Two main points distinguish the 
theories. First, under the papal theory of discovery, European monarchs, 
acting in combination with the Catholic Church, possessed nearly 
unabridged authority to vanquish Christian infidels and assert ownership 
over their lands. This power derived from the Church’s assertion of 
universal ecclesiastical jurisdiction. In theory, the power was limited by 
Pope Innocent IV’s argument regarding infidel rights. In practice, however, 
Innocent’s argument carried little force and effect. This was especially true 
regarding the discovery claims made in the Americas and elsewhere by 
Spain and Portugal under the bulls of donation.108  
By contrast, Vitoria’s right of discovery secured for Europeans only a 
qualified right to travel among and engage in commerce with the American 
Indians; to be afforded equal opportunity to share in their common 
resources; and to preach the Christian gospel to them freely. Vitoria was 
emphatic: discovery alone could not occasion just title.109 Only in the event 
of Indian hostilities or violation of the rights accorded by natural law did he 
discern that the Europeans could legitimately wage war or make adverse 
claim to Indian lands.110 Vitoria firmly rejected the papal claim of universal 
power to subjugate and assert dominion over the lands of infidels. Neither 
the papacy nor the Spanish monarch held a legitimate claim to worldwide 
dominion.111  
Second, the theory of terra infidelibus did not differentiate between 
genuinely unoccupied lands and those inhabited by non-European infidels. 
When the Spanish and Portuguese began to explore and lay claim to lands 
in Africa, the Americas, and elsewhere, Pope Innocent IV’s position on 
infidel rights became impotent. The papacy and its political affiliates 
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effectively treated all lands of non-European indigenous peoples as if they 
were unoccupied.  
Vitoria, by contrast, categorically distinguished European discovery of 
inhabited foreign lands from lands that were truly unoccupied. He 
acknowledged that by the law of nations, “a thing which does not belong to 
anyone (res nullius) becomes the property of the first taker.”112 So too does 
natural law stipulate that lands belonging to no one (terra nullius) become 
the property of the first discoverer or occupier. Vitoria understood this 
precept of first possession as applying only to lands “unoccupied or 
deserted.”113 This was because his conception of natural law bore the 
influence of the awakening humanism in Renaissance thought. He argued 
that freedom is the natural condition of all humans.114 As free persons in 
aboriginal occupancy of lands in the Americas before the arrival of the 
Spanish, the Indians “undoubtedly possessed [their lands] as true dominion, 
both public and private, as any Christians.”115 No Christian monarch or pope 
could strip them of that dominion by mere will or on account of their 
unbelief.116 Therefore, Vitoria concluded, “the Spaniards, when they first 
sailed to the land of the [Indians], carried with them no right at all to occupy 
their countries.”117 
This circumscribed right of discovery formulated by Vitoria exerted far 
greater influence over the European exploration and colonization of what 
became the United States than the medieval papal sense of terra infidelibus. 
This is not to deny that some American colonists used the rhetoric of 
Christian salvation to rationalize their encroachment into Indian lands.118 
Yet the rhetoric of individuals, even individual politicians, does not provide 
conclusive evidence of sovereign policy. The rhetoric must be accompanied 
by sovereign action and reflect at least part of the sovereign’s motive. 
Moreover, to the limited extent that British colonists in the Americas sought 
to justify their expropriation of Indian lands with missionary rhetoric, it used 
a rhetoric wholly severed from the doctrine of terra infidelibus. For that 
discovery doctrine rested on papal authority, and the British colonial 
ventures in North America never depended upon a pontifical grant.119 
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C. Hugo Grotius 
Though the papal discovery doctrine had little impact on the European 
exploration and settlement of what became the United States, Vitoria’s right 
of discovery did. As the sixteenth century wore on, Vitoria’s principle 
supplanted the papal doctrine of terra infidelibus for all European maritime 
powers other than Spain and Portugal. By the start of the 1600s, it was the 
most prominent discovery doctrine and one of the earliest principles of 
international law. The eminent Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius appealed to it both 
in his early works, De Jure Praedae Commentarius (Commentary on the 
Law of Prize and Booty) (c. 1604)120 and Mare Liberum (The Free Sea) 
(1609),121 and in his monumental De Jure Belli ac Pacis (The Rights of War 
and Peace) (1625).122 Citing Vitoria, Grotius insisted that discovery 
provides a right to claim foreign lands only if they are truly unoccupied. He 
wrote: 
Nor is it less unjust to go to War, and lay Claim to a Place upon the 
Score of making the first Discovery of it, if already inhabited, tho’ 
the Possessor should be a wicked Man, or have false Notions of GOD, 
or be of a stupid Mind; because by the Right of Discovery we can 
pretend to those Places only which are not appropriated.123 
Grotius admonished both the Spanish and Portuguese for failing to abide 
by the limitations inherent in the right of discovery. He argued that both 
nations had offended natural law and the law of nations by displacing 
indigenous populations across the globe without just cause. Further, Pope 
Alexander VI had lacked authority to partition the world between Spain and 
Portugal in the bull Inter caetera II.124 For the sea is free, Grotius 
maintained; it is a paradigm of common property and cannot, by natural 
reason and the law of nations, be appropriated and parceled.125 The freedom 
of the seas extends to the seashores,126 thereby endowing all nations with a 
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right to explore and lay claim to unoccupied lands.127 Yet land must be 
genuinely unoccupied to be justly claimed.128 For the right of discovery is 
not a “right of prey.”129 Accordingly, Grotius concluded that the Spanish 
conquests in the Americas could not be justified by right of discovery. As 
Vitoria had argued, the American Indians enjoyed proper dominion over 
their lands and possessions.130 The mere sailing to the Americas and sighting 
or setting foot on their islands and provinces gave the Spaniards no right to 
assert possession.131 
Grotius further categorically rejected all pretext of religious justification 
for the appropriation of indigenous lands in the Americas. He maintained 
that neither the Spaniards nor the papacy could expropriate American Indian 
lands on the ground that the Indians were infidels and would “not 
acknowledge the doctrine of true [Christian] religion.”132 For accepting 
Christianity as the true religion requires a faith irreducible to reason.133 
Upon first hearing, the story of the resurrection of Christ and of the miracles 
and testimonies reported in the New Testament can seem wildly 
improbable. Truly accepting Christianity, Grotius argued, is thus 
exceedingly difficult “without the inward Assistance of GOD’s grace.”134 It 
should never be “forced by temporal Punishments, or be awed by the Dread 
of them.”135 Inexplicably to human reason, God has revealed himself to 
some persons and not others, and has enabled widespread faith across some 
cultures while permitting the gospel to go unheeded elsewhere.136 
Accordingly, Grotius reasoned that religion must be understood as a cultural 
practice, and differences in culture, customs, and traditions do not give one 
people or nation just cause to vanquish another.137 He found this proposition 
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to be conclusively established by Vitoria, and long before him by 
Boethius138 and Aquinas.139 
Grotius did allow, however, for legitimate Spanish claims in the 
Americas on the basis of what he called “the law of hospitality”140 or “law 
of human fellowship.”141 Vitoria had argued for a natural right to trade which 
complemented and could enlarge the right of discovery.142 He maintained 
that violation of this right could provide just cause to commence war and 
seize property.143 Grotius agreed. To him, the right to trade was a corollary 
to the freedom of the seas. Freedom to engage in trade and commerce with 
peoples of foreign lands followed necessarily from the common right of all 
nations to navigate the seas to foreign ports. The law of nations recognized 
this.144 It also obliged, by the law of hospitality, those in foreign lands to 
provide safe harbor and engage in trade with seafarers who reached their 
ports.145 The law of hospitality further ensured travelers safe passage across 
foreign lands, so long as their trespass was harmless.146 The combined 
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weight of the right to trade and the law hospitality led Grotius to conclude 
that in those cases where the Spaniards were prevented from trading or 
traveling safely among the American Indians, they acted with just cause in 
taking tribal lands by force.147 In other situations, however, he suggested 
that those justifications were no more than a subterfuge for unjust 
appropriation.148 
D. Alberico Gentili 
The Italian jurist Alberico Gentili, widely viewed alongside Vitoria and 
Grotius as a founder of international law, affirmed Vitoria’s principle in 
terms generally similar to Grotius. In his principal treatise, De Iure Belli 
Libri Tres (The Law of War Three Books) (1612),149 Gentili agreed with 
Vitoria and Grotius that the first precept of the right of discovery is terra 
nullius—“the seizure of vacant places is regarded as a law of nature;”150 
“those who take [vacant land] have a right to it, since it is the property of no 
one.”151 He further assented to its second precept—that land must be truly 
unoccupied to be taken on discovery. “Those lands which are not vacant,” 
he wrote, “ought not to be taken.”152 From there, Gentili drew from the law 
of nations the same three qualifications to the second precept as Grotius: 
namely, that initiating hostilities and seizing inhabited foreign lands is 
justified “if it is undertaken because of some privilege of nature which is 
denied us by man. For example, if a right of way is refused us, or if we are 
excluded from harbours or kept from provisions, commerce, or trade.”153 
Specifically as to the Americas, Gentili noted that the Spanish appealed to 
these rights to defend their waring and suppression of indigenous 
dominium.154 He conceded that to the extent the Spaniards’ rights were in 
fact infringed, they had a legitimate defense against charges of unjust 
aggression and unlawful appropriation.155 Yet Gentili considered their 
defense in general a diversion and ruse: 
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But the Spaniards were aiming there [in the Americas], not at 
commerce, but at dominion. And they regarded it as beyond dispute 
that it was lawful to take possession of those lands which were not 
previously known to us; just as if to be known to none of us were the 
same thing as to be possessed by no one.156 
This passage makes it appear that Gentili conceived of the right of 
discovery more favorably to the American Indians than either Vitoria or 
Grotius. He did adopt a more critical stance toward Spain than Grotius, 
suggesting that the Spaniards’ discovery claims in the New World were 
mainly pretextual. Yet the appearance deceives, for Gentili added further 
conditions to the right of discovery beyond those found in Vitoria or 
Grotius. They each qualified the discovery right’s second precept with a set 
of conditions grounded in natural law and the law of nations. Gentili 
adopted the same conditions as Grotius—that occupied land could be 
appropriated following discovery if the inhabitants infringed the 
discoverers’ rights to navigate free seas to open harbors, to engage in trade 
and commerce, or to pass unmolested through others’ property.157 To these, 
Gentili added three more considerations which substantially compromised 
the discovery right’s second precept such as to enable Western Europe’s 
maritime powers to pursue their adventurous colonial ambitions. 
The first consideration Gentili added was to posit that the earth contained 
an abundance of unoccupied land. This assumption, wholly disassociated 
from natural law, significantly muted the effect of the right of discovery’s 
limiting second precept. Again, the first precept of the right of discovery is 
terra nullius—unoccupied land, by the law of nature, is free to be taken by 
a discovering nation. The second precept limits the first. It stipulates that 
land must be truly unoccupied to be taken by discovery; lands that are 
inhabited ought not be taken. How much of the earth is characterized as 
unoccupied, and how much is deemed inhabited, thus determines the 
amount of land available for the taking under the first precept of the right of 
discovery.  
During the era of European discovery there was no measure for assessing 
whether land was ‘unoccupied’ or ‘occupied.’ Hence, application of the 
right of discovery turned, in substantial part, on two assumptions. First, the 
natural law philosophers made general factual assumptions about the 
amount of the earth that was unoccupied. Second, they premised the right 
of discovery’s application, as to particular regions, on subjective judgments 
















European standards, to classify the land as ‘occupied.’ As to the Americas, 
Vitoria presumed that most of the land was occupied.158 Gentili assumed the 
opposite. Asking rhetorically, “But are there to-day no unoccupied lands on 
the earth?”—he replied that the world is “being reduced more and more to 
the wilderness of primeval times.”159 This is true, he continued, most of all 
in the Americas: “It is the most populous country of all; yet under the rule 
of Spain is not almost all of the New World unoccupied?”160 By this 
understanding, Gentili opened for European appropriation under the first 
precept of the right of discovery a much greater amount of indigenous land 
in the Americas than contemplated by Vitoria or Grotius. 
Beyond this consequential assumption about the unoccupied condition 
of the Americas, Gentili introduced two further considerations affecting the 
second precept of the right of discovery. While affirming that a discovering 
nation can only expropriate lands in the Americas that are truly vacant, he 
stipulated that the Indians should share their abundance, reasoning that “a 
slight loss ought to be endured.”161 Further, Gentili maintained that those in 
possession of land are obligated to put it to beneficial use or justifiably risk 
suffering its loss.162 He reasoned that God did not create the earth for it to 
remain vacant soil.163 Thus, the discovering nations of Europe could take 
indigenous lands in the Americas if the Indians were not using them 
productively, based on European standards. He argued that “even though 
such lands belong to the sovereign of that territory, . . . yet because of that 
law of nature which abhors a vacuum, they will fall to the lot of those who 
take them.”164 Gentili found support for this proposition in a law issued by 
the second century Roman emperor Pertinax “who assigned all the 
uncultivated land in Italy and the rest of the world to those who would take 
possession of it and improve it.”165 
Gentili thus characterized the right of discovery in a manner more 
accommodating to European exploration than both Vitoria and Grotius. 
Though he remained true to the basic structure of Vitoria’s principle— 
positing two central precepts and a set of qualifying conditions grounded in 
natural law—Gentili’s three supplemental considerations augured a more 
flexible right of discovery. Direct evidence of how these considerations 
influenced subsequent understanding of the right of discovery is lacking. 
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However, the same line of argument that Gentili introduced was taken up 
later and developed more fully by others, most notably the English 
philosopher John Locke and the Swiss jurist Emer de Vattel.  
E. John Locke 
In The Second Treatise of Government (1690), John Locke argued in 
defense of a natural right to private property.166 He wrote outside the natural 
law tradition, and his work should not be taken as furthering the right of 
discovery per se. Yet Locke’s political philosophy was taught and studied 
in England and the American colonies during the eighteenth century. His 
theory of natural rights to life, liberty, and property167 inspired some of the 
principal founders of the American republic.168 Hence it is worth briefly 
noting that the assumptions Gentili grafted onto the right of discovery 
became foundational premises in the philosophy of natural rights that was 
most influential during the formative era of British colonial expansion in 
North America. 
Like Gentili, Locke viewed most of the New World as an uncultivated 
commons of little value.169 He maintained that in the Americas “there are 
still great tracts of ground to be found which . . . lie waste, and are more 
than the people who dwell on it do or can make use of, and so still lie in 
common.”170 The American Indians, he argued, should share this plenty. For 
“God gave the world to men . . . for their benefit and the greatest 
conveniences of life,”171 yet in its natural state, the earth is “almost 
worthless.”172 Uncultivated for planting or unenclosed for livestock, land is 
“waste land.”173 Locke believed that those, like the American Indians, 
whose possessions exceed what they can put to productive use thus are 
“exceeding . . . the bounds of . . . just property.”174 Accordingly, the lands 
they do not make use of are “still to be looked on as waste and might be the 
possession of any other.”175 
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The American Indians’ occupancy of their tribal lands thus constituted 
“just property” ownership on Locke’s account only to the extent that those 
lands were put to beneficial use. By his measure, “great tracts of [tribal] 
ground” were not being used productively, and thus, as “waste land,” 
remained part of the commons and freely available for appropriation. Yet 
by this Locke was not striving to justify the territorial claims to Indian lands 
made by European sovereigns. He was not contemplating or promoting the 
right of discovery. Rather, he was seeking to establish the   natural right of 
individuals to possess private property. He argued that everyone has a 
personal, natural right to work common land and, through their industry and 
labor, appropriate it as their own.176 For “[a]s much land as a man tills, 
plants, improves, cultivates, and can use the product of, so much is his 
property.”177 That is to say, on Locke’s account, the “subduing or cultivating 
the earth and having dominion . . . are joined together” in the farms, estates, 
and homesteads of individuals.178 
F. Emer de Vattel 
Though Locke did not write in contemplation of the right of discovery, 
the Swiss jurist Emer de Vattel did. In his influential eighteenth-century 
treatise, The Law of Nations (1758),179 Vattel advanced a line of argument 
remarkably similar to Locke’s. Like Locke, Vattel included all three of the 
supplemental considerations that Gentili introduced in 1612. Unlike Locke, 
and more directly than Gentili, he expressly treated them as central elements 
of the right of discovery. 
Consistent with Vitoria, Grotius, and Gentili, Vattel began his discussion 
of the right of discovery by affirming the principle of terra nullius as a 
natural right of all nations. He wrote: 
All mankind have an equal right to things that have not yet fallen into 
the possession of any one; and those things belong to the person who 
first takes possession of them. When therefore a nation finds a 
country uninhabited and without an owner, it may lawfully take 
possession of it.180 
Only by implication, however, did Vattel acknowledge the second 
discovery precept of true vacancy that was affirmed by his predecessors. 
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Vitoria, Grotius, and Gentili each emphasized that laying claim to occupied 
land by discovery was unjust and an offense against the law of nature.181 
Vattel did not directly accept (or deny) that proposition. Nor did he mention 
any of the qualifying conditions the others attached to it. 
Vattel instead went directly from the first discovery precept of terra 
nullius to ask what he called the “celebrated question, to which the 
discovery of the new world has principally given rise.”182 The question was, 
“whether a nation may lawfully take possession of some part of a vast 
country, in which there are none but erratic nations whose scanty population 
is incapable of occupying the whole?”183 Vattel’s framing of this question 
presupposed his analysis. The Americas comprised a “vast country” with a 
“scanty population” that left much of the land unoccupied.184 “[I]mmense 
regions” in the Americas remained unsettled, where “the savages stood in 
no particular need, and of which they made no actual and constant use.”185 
Since God gave the earth to humans “to furnish them with subsistence,” 
Vattel surmised that it is the duty of all people to cultivate the land and bring 
forth its bounty.186 For “if each nation had from the beginning resolved to 
appropriate to itself a vast country, that the people might live only by 
hunting, fishing, and wild fruits, our globe would not be sufficient to 
maintain a tenth part of its present inhabitants.”187 Hence, Vattel contended 
that the American Indians’ “unsettled habitation in those immense regions 
cannot be accounted a true and legal possession.”188 Accordingly, “the 
people of Europe . . . were lawfully entitled to take possession of [the 
Indians’ land], and settle it with colonies.”189 
Vattel thus presented the right of discovery as a doctrine of European 
entitlement. For all practical purposes, he removed the doctrine’s limiting 
second precept: that inhabited land could not be claimed on discovery. 
Vitoria had argued that, as to their ancestral homelands, the American 
Indians “possessed true dominion both in public and private affairs.”190 He 
insisted that Europeans, by the law of nature, were bound to honor and 
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respect that dominion.191 This was affirmed by both Grotius192 and 
Gentili.193 Vattel, however, rejected or at least ignored this limiting 
proposition. To him, population density and beneficial use—both as 
understood by European standards—provided the determining criteria for 
whether land should be deemed true and legal dominion. Measured by those 
standards, American Indian dominion faltered. For Indian occupancy of 
tribal homelands was relatively low density and the land was not put to 
productive, i.e., agricultural, use. Hence, to Vattel, Indian occupancy could 
not “be accounted a true and legal possession.”194 This entitled Europeans 
to claim Indian lands adversely. Vattel concluded: “We do not therefore 
deviate from the views of nature in confining the Indians within narrower 
limits.”195 
G. Samuel Pufendorf 
While Vattel sought to override the limiting condition of true vacancy 
that Vitoria included in the right of discovery, the German legal philosopher 
Samuel Pufendorf reaffirmed and strengthened that precept. Arguably the 
most influential natural law philosopher of the Enlightenment, Pufendorf 
viewed that second, limiting precept as the hallmark of the right of 
discovery.  
According to Pufendorf, “Premier Seisin, or the first Occupancy” of 
things provides the original way property is appropriated.196 He affirmed 
that it is the foundation of the right of discovery: “After this manner Titles 
are made to desolate Regions, which no Man ever claim’d, which become 
his who first enters upon ‘em with an Intention of making them his own, 
provided he cultivate them and assign Limits how far he propounds to 
occupy.”197 Yet as with Vitoria, Grotius, and Gentili, Pufendorf insisted that 
this precept, the principle of terra nullius, is strictly limited to lands “which 
no Man ever claim’d.”198 He articulated this limitation differently from 
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those others, however. For Pufendorf reasoned that it gives rise to certain 
duties implicit in the law of nature. He wrote: 
Every Man is obliged to suffer another, who is not a declared Enemy, 
quietly to enjoy whatsoever Things are his; and neither by Fraud or 
Violence to spoil, . . . removing of Boundaries, and the like Crimes, 
which tend to the Invading and Incroaching upon other Mens 
Properties, are forbidden.199 
Pufendorf added that should any person realize that they are in possession 
of property that rightfully belongs to others, “the Duty of Restitution” makes 
them “obliged to take care, as far as in [them] lies, to return it to its right 
Owner.”200 
With these duties, Pufendorf laid the groundwork for a more robust 
characterization of the right of discovery than any of his predecessors. 
Vitoria, Grotius, and Gentili conceived of the second, limiting precept of 
discovery as a simple proposition entailed by negative implication from the 
principle of terra nullius. Vitoria reasoned that since the law of nations 
affirms that “a thing which does not belong to anyone (res nullius) becomes 
the property of the first taker,”201 it follows that things which do belong to 
someone, i.e., occupied lands over which others have rightful dominion, 
may not be claimed on the basis of discovery alone.202 Grotius agreed that 
the right of discovery entitled European nations to assert ownership over 
“those Places only which are not appropriated;”203 hence, it is “unjust to.       
. . . lay Claim to a Place upon the Score of making the first Discovery of it, 
if already inhabited.”204 Gentili similarly inferred from the precept that since 
“seizure of vacant places is regarded as a law of nature,”205 it follows that 
“lands which are not vacant . . . ought not to be taken.”206 
Pufendorf did not draw such a simple negative inference. Rather, from 
what he called the right of first occupancy (the first precept of discovery), 
he inferred the three duties stipulated in the passages quoted above, to wit: 
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Duty of Respect: The duty to respect the property rights of others, 
such that they may “quietly . . . enjoy whatsoever Things are 
[theirs].”207  
Duty of Non-appropriation: The duty to refrain from taking any 
action which would “tend to the Invading and Incroaching upon other 
Mens Properties.”208 
Duty of Restitution: The duty “to take care, as far as in us lies, to 
return [wrongfully appropriated property] to its right Owner.”209 
These duties collectively represent Pufendorf’s second precept of 
discovery. In two respects, they provide a more powerful limiting precept 
than the negative inferences drawn by the others. First, taken together, 
Pufendorf’s three duties make for a more comprehensive limiting principle. 
The duty of non-appropriation by itself is equivalent to the others’ second 
discovery precepts. Consider, for example, Gentili’s second precept: “lands 
which are not vacant . . . ought not to be taken.”210 Pufendorf’s duty of non-
appropriation contains the full content of that proposition—i.e., lands which 
are “other Mens Properties” ought not be “Invad[ed] and Incroach[ed] 
upon.”211 Yet beyond that negative duty, Pufendorf proffered the two 
positive duties of respect and restitution. These add substantial weight to the 
second precept of the right of discovery, for they oblige all people to 
affirmatively honor the dominion of others and restore its integrity if it is 
wrongfully compromised. These positive obligations go well beyond the 
bare prohibition against seeking to appropriate others’ property. 
The second way Pufendorf’s three duties led to a more seriously limited 
right of discovery is that he refused to qualify them. This was unlike any of 
his predecessors. Vitoria qualified his second discovery precept by arguing 
that in the aftermath of Spanish ‘discovery’ of their lands, the American 
Indians were obligated to respect the Spaniards’ natural rights to travel 
among and trade with them, to be given fair opportunity to share their 
common resources, and to preach the Christian gospel. If the Indians 
infringed any of these rights, the Spaniards could adversely lay claim to 
their lands.212 Grotius and Gentili adopted similar qualifying conditions. By 
contrast, Pufendorf rejected this approach altogether. 
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In his seminal work Of the Law of Nature and Nations (1672),213 
Pufendorf levelled withering criticism against Vitoria. He argued against 
each of Vitoria’s natural rights to travel, trade, and partake of common 
goods. To Pufendorf, Vitoria’s right to travel fell under what Grotius 
referred to more generally as the law or “Right of Hospitality.”214 Pufendorf 
readily acknowledged this right as a fundamental “Duty of Humanity.”215 
He affirmed that it is incumbent upon all people to admit strangers, welcome 
travelers, and provide the needy with access to shore and shelter.216 Yet he 
cautioned that “to give a natural Right to these Favours, it is requisite that 
the Stranger be absent from his own House on an honest, or on a necessary 
Account.”217 The right does not extend to “those who wander into foreign 
Countries purely on account of Curiosity.”218  
Further, Pufendorf objected to Vitoria’s right to travel on two additional 
grounds. For one, he thought it denied indigenous peoples their right to 
cultural self-determination. Vitoria’s natural right implied that being 
hospitable obliges a self-sufficient people to welcome any foreigners who 
wish to travel or explore in their homeland for any reason. Pufendorf found 
this to be unjust. He wrote, “[b]ut supposing that any one Nation, contented 
with what it finds at home, utterly refrains from all foreign Travel, it does 
not appear what Obligation such a State can have to admit those who would 
visit it, without a necessary or weighty Cause.”219  
Even more damning on Pufendorf’s account was the apparently 
unlimited scope of the obligation entailed by Vitoria’s right to travel. The 
right seemingly set no temporal bounds or limit on the number of foreigners 
a people was duty-bound to accept. Pufendorf found this ludicrous: 
[I]t seems very gross and absurd, to allow others an indefinite or 
unlimited Right of travelling and living amongst us, without 
reflecting either on their Number, or on the Design of their coming; 
whether supporting them to pass harmlesly, they intend only to take 
a short view of our Country, or whether they claim a Right of fixing 
themselves with us for ever. And that he who will stretch the Duty of 
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Hospitality to this extravagant Extent, ought to be rejected as a most 
unreasonable, and most improper Judge of the Case.220 
Vitoria’s right to travel thus struck Pufendorf as overbroad. He viewed 
it as allowing unjust encroachment upon the dominion of indigenous 
nations. Likewise, he thought Vitoria’s natural rights to trade and share 
common resources were equally indefensible. He dealt with both 
summarily. To Pufendorf, the right to trade was inscrutable. He argued that 
no sovereigns have the power to compel their own subjects to engage in 
trade or commerce with each other.221 It is incomprehensible to think that 
the far more ambitious proposition could be true, that there is “any such 
Liberty of trading” in the law of nature or nations that “shall force and 
obtrude Strangers upon us, whether we will or no.”222 Pufendorf similarly 
questioned whether Vitoria’s right to share common resources could be 
found in the law of nature or nations. Vitoria’s proposition was, “If the 
Indians had amongst them any Rights and Privileges allow’d in common to 
Natives and Foreigners, in these they ought not to hinder the Spaniards from 
their Share: For Example, If other Strangers were permitted to dig Gold, 
the Spaniards might fairly claim the same Liberty.”223 Pufendorf challenged 
this by asking “first, whether those Privileges were granted to others, by 
way of Debt, or by way of free Gift and Favour.”224 If by way of debt, he 
argued that no right can be said to extend generally to strangers.225 Further, 
Pufendorf expressed doubt about whether the right to the commons was an 
unlimited right. If it entitled the Spaniards to share in the common resources 
of the American Indians as far as the Spaniards in their discretion saw fit, 
then it made the Indians vulnerable to the rapine of their resources. For the 
Indians would have no say over “whether these new Comers will behave 
themselves with the same Justice and Modesty” as the Indians themselves, 
or even “whether these late Guests propose no other End of their Visit.”226 
That is to say, Vitoria’s right to the commons potentially opened American 
Indian land and resources to unlimited European appropriation. 
Given these injustices implicit in the conditions that Vitoria placed on 
the second precept of discovery, Pufendorf offered a counter-proposition: 
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Admission of Strangers, as they think convenient.”227 This could be 
understood as Pufendorf’s third precept of discovery. He reasoned that 
every people and culture is entitled to act in its own “interest and safety.”228 
No nation can be obligated to accept strangers in such numbers as to subject 
itself to danger and injury. This included the American Indians in advance 
of the adventurous Spaniards. For no people, Pufendorf concluded, can be 
obligated “to receive and incorporate a great Multitude, especially if now in 
Arms, or naturally addicted to War; since it is scarce possible, but that their 
Admission should highly endanger the Natives.”229 
Pufendorf’s critique of Vitoria highlights the varied content that the 
natural law right of discovery took over time. Yet the contrast between 
Vitoria and Pufendorf was not as stark as that between either of them and 
Gentili or Vattel. Quite simply, the right of discovery, though a single 
doctrine grounded in natural law, was highly variable. Vitoria and Grotius 
were the most similar. They each offered a relatively balanced discovery 
right, insisting that the dominion of indigenous populations be protected 
while positing limited sets of natural rights which enabled European 
colonial expansion. Pufendorf’s right of first occupancy, with its derivative 
duties to respect and restore native dominion, was the most favorable to 
American Indians and other indigenous peoples. By contrast, Gentili and 
Vattel were the least favorable. Both conceived of the right of discovery as 
a doctrine of European entitlement. Their assumptions that much of the 
world—and nearly all the New World—was unoccupied gave Europeans a 
near carte blanche to explore and expropriate. Gentili presented Europeans 
with a broad range of rationales for overriding native occupancy. Vattel 
diminished the legitimacy of aboriginal title, arguing that the Indians’ sparse 
populations and “unsettled habitation” of the Americas “cannot be 
accounted a true and legal possession.”230 
Nonetheless, these jurists’ understandings of discovery all fall within the 
same doctrinal family. Their foundation in natural law and the law of 
nations places them in the same theoretic traditions. Despite their 
contrasting features, they differ even more from the ecclesiastically-
grounded papal theory of discovery. Their foundation in natural law also 
distinguishes them doctrinally from the next discovery doctrine, the 
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III. PRINCIPLE OF DISCOVERY IN THE UNITED STATES 
A. General Principles of Federal Indian Law 
Beginning with its earliest nineteenth century cases addressing tribal 
relations, the United States Supreme Court has made the idea of discovery 
a bedrock principle of federal Indian law. This is found most prominently 
in the first and third cases of the Marshall trilogy: Johnson v. M’Intosh and 
Worcester v. Georgia. In Johnson v. M’Intosh (1823), the Court referenced 
the natural law right of discovery.231 But Chief Justice John Marshall, 
writing for the Court, did not abide by it. Rather, he subtly moved away 
from it in pragmatic adaptation to the history of European exploration of 
North America, two centuries of English colonial settlement, and certain 
peculiarities in the common law concept of property. This led to a distinct 
principle of discovery not to be confused with the natural law right of 
discovery. 
Beginning with the Marshall trilogy, the Supreme Court has consistently 
acknowledged that prior to the European settlement of North America, the 
Indian tribes were self-governing political communities.232 Each enjoyed 
the “inherent powers” of a sovereign.233 Incorporation into the United States 
diminished that sovereignty,234 but did not abrogate it.235 The tribes became 
limited sovereigns,236 semi-independent entities existing within the 
geographic boundaries of American society.237 The Court characterizes this 
retained sovereignty as neither that of a foreign nation238 nor of a state of 
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the union.239 Rather, Indian tribes comprise “unique aggregations” 
exercising a range of sovereign powers over their land and members.240  
Among the incidences of sovereignty that the Supreme Court has 
frequently recognized as retained by the Indians is some degree of dominion 
over their tribal homelands. The scope of those retained rights was before 
the Court in both Johnson v. M’Intosh and Worcester v. Georgia. In both 
cases, the Court addressed the question of tribal dominion primarily by 
considering the correlative question of how the United States came to 
lawfully possess dominion over such vast territory in North America. The 
Court’s answer was the principle of discovery. 
B. Johnson v. M’Intosh 
Chief Justice Marshall characterized the principle of discovery in 
Johnson v. M’Intosh as a doctrine premised on creating two relationships. 
First, it put in place an agreement between the great maritime powers of 
Europe. The agreement was that the first among them to ‘discover’ a 
particular region in the Americas would hold an exclusive right to establish 
settlements and acquire title of ownership from its indigenous inhabitants. 
Marshall described this relationship between the European nations as 
follows: 
This principle was, that discovery gave title to the government by 
whose subjects, or by whose authority, it was made, against all other 
European governments, which title might be consummated by 
possession. 
The exclusion of all other Europeans, necessarily gave the nation 
making the discovery the sole right of acquiring the soil from the 
natives, and establishing settlements upon it. It was a right with which 
no Europeans could interfere. It was a right which all asserted for 
themselves, and to the assertion of which, by others, all assented.241 
This is to say that the first object of the principle of discovery was to 
enable European conquest of the Americas while ensuring peaceful 
relations among the competing maritime powers. The principle sought to 
prevent continual conflict and war between European nations in their empire 
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building.242 It postulated an implicit agreement to recognize “the exclusive 
right of the discoverer to appropriate the lands occupied by the Indians.”243 
Marshall maintained that for the most part this principle had been 
effective.244 For as a matter of historical fact, it was recognized and 
respected by “all the nations of Europe, who have acquired territory on this 
[American] continent.”245 
The second discovery relationship the Supreme Court posited in Johnson 
v. M’Intosh was between individual European and Indian nations after 
‘discovery.’ It concerned their relations during colonial settlement, along 
with the terms and conditions by which the European nation could acquire 
title to tribal lands. The specific terms of each relationship were to be 
regulated by mutual agreement.246 The principle of discovery set the 
parameters. Marshall wrote: 
In the establishment of these relations, the rights of the original 
inhabitants were, in no instance, entirely disregarded; but were 
necessarily, to a considerable extent, impaired. They were admitted 
to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just 
claim to retain possession of it, and to use it according to their own 
discretion; but their rights to complete sovereignty, as independent 
nations, were necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose of 
the soil at their own will, to whomsoever they pleased, was denied by 
the original fundamental principle, that discovery gave exclusive title 
to those who made it.247 
By this, the Supreme Court affirmed that before European exploration 
and settlement in the Americas, each Indian tribe held a natural right of 
possession over the lands it occupied.248 The European settler nations were 
to respect the Indians’ right to continued occupancy.249 The Indians’ right 
to remain in possession and use their tribal homelands was thus protected. 
However, the discovery principle vested the ultimate fee title to 
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‘discovered’ tribal lands in the European nation making the exclusive 
claim.250 During the American colonial period, England had come to hold 
the underlying fee title to the full territory that comprised the colonies. 
When the United States gained independence, it accordingly acquired “clear 
title” to all lands within its territorial boundaries.251 Chief Justice Marshall 
was adamant, however, that the new republic acquired no greater title than 
what England had previously held. He reasoned that “neither the declaration 
of independence, nor the treaty confirming it, could give [the United States] 
more than that which [the colonies] before possessed, or to which Great 
Britain was before entitled.”252 The “clear title” which the United States 
acquired at independence, that is, was the ultimate interest in fee simple “to 
all the lands within the boundary lines described in the treaty, subject only 
to the Indian right of occupancy.”253 The Indians retained a legal as well as 
a moral right to continued use and occupancy of their aboriginal lands.254 
Yet those rights had become greatly limited.255 Moreover, they were fully 
defeasible. For the nascent United States government asserted the right to 
unilaterally extinguish tribal land holdings at any time through purchase or 
conquest.256 
C. Worcester v. Georgia 
In Worcester v. Georgia, decided nine years after Johnson v. M’Intosh, 
Chief Justice Marshall reaffirmed that the European settlement of North 
America had proceeded according to the principle of discovery.257 Calling 
it a “settled doctrine of the law of nations,”258 he asserted that the principle 
comprised “the general law of European sovereigns, respecting their claims 
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Worcester, like Johnson, described the fundamental object of the 
principle of discovery as establishing two relationships. The first 
relationship remained constant across the two decisions. Marshall 
reaffirmed that in its first purpose the principle acknowledged an agreement 
by the European maritime powers “as between themselves.”261 This largely 
implicit agreement aimed to preempt hostilities by settling in advance 
competing European claims to indigenous lands in the New World. The 
agreement was that title to a particular region would go to the first among 
them to ‘discover’ it, so as to “avoid bloody conflicts, which might 
terminate disastrously to all.”262 Marshall reasoned: 
This principle [of discovery], acknowledged by all Europeans, 
because it was the interest of all to acknowledge it, gave to the nation 
making the discovery, as its inevitable consequence, the sole right of 
acquiring the soil and of making settlements on it. It was an exclusive 
principle which shut out the right of competition . . . . It regulated the 
right given by discovery among the European discoverers . . . .263 
This language matches Johnson’s description of the first discovery 
relationship. In this first purpose, the discovery principle thus remained 
unchanged across Marshall’s two opinions. 
As to its second purpose, however, the principle of discovery took on a 
new form in Worcester. The overall objective was unchanged: it aimed to 
set the parameters that would govern the relationship between a European 
nation and an American Indian tribe following European ‘discovery’ of the 
tribe’s homeland. Specifically, the purpose was to articulate the sovereignty 
and dominion of each, so as to facilitate the transfer of tribal land to the 
European colonial power. Worcester and Johnson described this sovereign 
relationship differently in two respects. First, they construed the rights 
retained by the Indians after discovery differently. Second, they set forth 
different processes for effecting land transfers. 
Johnson characterized the Indians’ retained property rights as a 
defeasible entitlement to occupy and use their ancestral tribal homelands. 
Marshall maintained that this right of tribal occupancy could be 
extinguished at will by the European nation which discovery had vested 
with the underlying and ultimate fee title. Unilateral action in the form of 
purchase or conquest by the discoverer nation or its assignees—e.g., the 
United States—could terminate a tribe’s right of occupancy and effectuate 
a land transfer.  
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Worcester, by contrast, did not characterize the Indians’ retained right of 
occupancy as defeasible at the will of the discoverer nation. Rather, 
Marshall argued that the Indian title of occupancy continued unimpaired, 
subject only to the discoverer nation’s “exclusive right of purchasing such 
lands as the natives were willing to sell.”264 He insisted that the mere fact of 
discovery “could not affect the rights of those already in possession, either 
as aboriginal occupants, or as occupants by virtue of a discovery made 
before the memory of man. It gave [only] the exclusive right to purchase.”265 
Marshall opined that it was an “extravagant and absurd idea” to think 
that the mere discovery of the Atlantic coast of North America and the 
founding of immigrant settlements could legitimately give Europeans the 
power to govern the native inhabitants and occupy the entire continent.266 
He argued that such an understanding of the power of discovery “did not 
enter the mind of any man.”267 For discovery regulated rights between 
European nations. The scope of those rights could not extend to the 
discovery of lands never imagined by the nations that had fashioned that 
implicit compact. Echoing Vitoria, Marshall reasoned: 
It is difficult to comprehend the proposition, that the inhabitants of 
either quarter of the globe could have rightful original claims of 
dominion over the inhabitants of the other, or over the lands they 
occupied; or that the discovery of either by the other should give the 
discoverer rights in the country discovered, which annulled the pre-
existing rights of its ancient possessors.268 
As such, Marshall argued that the colonial grants and charters from the 
British Crown and others “asserted a title against Europeans only, and were 
considered as blank paper so far as the rights of the natives were 
concerned.”269 The land rights that discovery gave the European powers 
were limited to the exclusive right to purchase those lands that the Indians 
were willing to sell.270 
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D. Contrasting the Principle of Discovery from the Papal and Natural 
Law Doctrines 
While Johnson v. M’Intosh and Worcester v. Georgia are somewhat 
inconsistent, the principle of discovery that Chief Justice Marshall 
articulated in those cases comprises a distinct discovery doctrine that stands 
markedly apart from both the papal and natural law theories of discovery. It 
is distinct in part because Marshall crafted it to serve a different purpose 
than those earlier theories. Both the papal and natural law discovery 
doctrines were designed to guide European maritime powers in their global 
exploration and colonization of foreign lands. They were doctrines aimed at 
justifying and, to a degree, limiting the scope of ongoing and future 
European expansion. By contrast, Marshall’s principle of discovery 
provided a theory to account for how, on the basis of European explorations 
then past and completed, a vast expanse of the North American continent 
had come to be held by the young republic of the United States. Only as to 
the second relationship which he articulated—that between the European 
discoverer nations or their assignees and individual Indian tribes—did 
Marshall’s principle offer a guide to future action. It provided a theoretical 
justification for future American acquisition of tribal lands. As to European 
discovery per se, it was a doctrine of history. 
The only commonality between Marshall’s principle and the papal 
theory of terra infidelibus is the bare concept of discovery. Marshall only 
mentioned the papal theory once in Johnson. He ignored it entirely in 
Worcester. In Johnson, he denied that Spain’s settlements in the New World 
depended upon a papal grant.271 Instead, Marshall argued that the principle 
he articulated provided the true historical basis for Spain’s discovery 
claims.272 
Marshall further thought that his principle of discovery provided a more 
historically accurate account of European exploration and settlement in the 
Americas than the natural law right of discovery. Johnson did make passing 
reference to that natural law doctrine.273 Marshall did not, however, rely on 
any precepts or rights grounded in natural law. Nor did he entertain the 
natural law doctrine’s two basic precepts. 
The natural law right of discovery, it will be recalled, rested on two basic 
propositions. First, terra nullius: unoccupied lands belonging to no one may 
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be seized and become the property of the first to discover them.274 Second, 
occupied land may not be seized on discovery; i.e., discovery alone does not 
provide just cause to appropriate land inhabited by others.275 Each of the 
natural law jurists understood this second, limiting precept differently, with 
all but Pufendorf allowing appropriation of occupied land if certain 
conditions were met.276 
Chief Justice Marshall paid no heed to these natural law precepts. To 
him, they set up a false dilemma. The precepts presumed that the 
appropriation of indigenous lands on discovery should turn on whether the 
lands were occupied. That is, if discovered lands were unoccupied, then 
terra nullius became operative; if the lands were occupied, then terra nullius 
did not control. As to the discovery of the New World, however, Marshall 
considered the principle of terra nullius irrelevant. For on his account, the 
question of whether land in the United States was unoccupied prior to 
European discovery was moot. He knew the land was occupied.277 The 
function served by the idea of discovery was not to feign a vacant continent. 
Instead, it was to explain how just title to the Indians’ aboriginal lands, 
which admittedly were occupied at the time of European exploration and 
settlement, had come to be held by the United States.  
The doctrine of discovery from Johnson v. M’Intosh and Worcester v. 
Georgia thus differs in its underlying assumptions and functional effect 
from both the papal and natural law discovery doctrines. One more distinct 
doctrine remains—terra nullius in the enlarged, unvarnished form 
employed by Great Britain in its appropriation and settlement of Australia. 
IV. ENLARGED PRINCIPLE OF TERRA NULLIUS IN AUSTRALIA 
A. British Settlement and Aboriginal Dispossession 
While Chief Justice Marshall’s principle of discovery and the natural law 
right of discovery both helped shape the course of European adventures and 
settlement in the New World, the deep-rooted idea of terra nullius, 
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operating as an independent and enlarged principle, proved vital in certain 
other regions colonized by Europeans. Australia was one such region where 
terra nullius served as the operative concept of colonization. Its application 
resulted in the systematic, uncompensated, and forceful taking of 
indigenous lands. 
European sea voyages to present-day Australia began early in the 
1600s.278 For the better part of a century, the expeditions were conducted 
primarily by the Dutch. After the famed Dutch seafarer Abel Tasman 
explored the region in 1642, the land became known as New Holland.279 
The first Brit to explore New Holland, William Dampier, set foot on its 
north coast in 1688.280 Not until after Captain James Cook charted the 
continent’s east coast in 1770 did Australia become a quarry for British 
colonial ambitions.281 
The British formally began to settle New Holland in 1788.282 They 
renamed its eastern part New South Wales, the name Cook had chosen.283 
Not until the 1820s did the name Australia enter common use.284 At first 
settlement, several indigenous populations inhabited the continent and its 
internal islands. Diverse communities of Aborigines on the continent and 
Torres Strait Islander peoples collectively yielded a population estimated 
between 300,000285 and three-quarters of a million.286 None of the 
indigenous peoples followed forms of social organization that the British 
could readily understand. The natives’ custodial relationships to their 
homelands also puzzled the British, for they did not entertain European-
style concepts of private property or land tenure. Nor could the British 
identify political leaders among them with whom to negotiate or bargain. 
The Crown accordingly began to settle and appropriate the entire Australian 
continent and its surrounding islands without troubling to follow any formal 
legal procedures.  
The British practice of seizing aboriginal lands across New South Wales 
and dispossessing the native occupants received judicial sanction in a select 
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set of early Australian cases. Attorney-General v. Brown (1847) held that, 
from the initial settlement of New South Wales, “all the waste and 
unoccupied lands of the colony” vested in the Crown.287 Implicit in this 
judgment was the assumption that the colony was relevantly uninhabited.288 
Williams v. Attorney-General for New South Wales (1913) similarly ruled 
that, upon first settlement, Britain held unqualified legal and beneficial title 
to all lands of the colony.289 Justice Isaacs considered this an 
“unquestionable position.”290 He further rejected any suggestion that the 
indigenous occupants had any claims which qualified or reduced the 
Crown’s absolute ownership.291 
Most significant is the 1889 judgment of the Privy Council in Cooper v. 
Stuart.292 The case came before the Privy Council on appeal from the New 
South Wales Supreme Court. At issue was application of the rule against 
perpetuities to a contingency in an 1823 Crown land grant.293 The case 
raised no issues of aboriginal land rights. Nonetheless, the Privy Council 
stated that, from its establishment, New South Wales “consisted of a tract 
of territory practically unoccupied, without settled inhabitants or settled 
law.”294 This assertion, while obiter dictum, became the principal 
authoritative support for the proposition that in 1788 there was no settled 
indigenous law of communal title in the colony to which the British owed 
respect.295 That is, Cooper v. Stuart became high authority for the 
proposition that, from its initial settlement, the territory of New South Wales 
was terra nullius in the expanded sense of ‘land belonging to no one for the 
purposes of law.’ 
From the beginning of its settlement of the then-Colony of New South 
Wales, England thus recognized no practical limits to its confiscation of 
indigenous lands. It asserted full legal ownership over the whole of the 
continent and its surrounding islands. Land transfers by the indigenous 
inhabitants were prohibited. The Crown justified this by portraying the 
native populations as so low on the scale of social development that no 
proprietary rights or interests could be imputed to them. An 1837 report to 
the British House of Commons by the Select Committee on Aborigines 
described the indigenous Australians as “barbarous” and “so entirely 
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destitute . . . of the rudest forms of civil polity, that their claims, whether as 
sovereigns or proprietors of the soil, have been utterly disregarded.”296 To 
the British, they were altogether unfit for legal agency. 
In this way, the principle of terra nullius became operative in Australia. 
Yet this was not terra nullius in the forms previously discussed. The 
medieval papal theory of discovery was premised on terra nullius in the 
expanded ecclesiastical form of terra infidelibus. The Catholic popes 
assumed the power to commission sympathetic monarchs to conquer 
foreign lands inhabited by no one but non-Christians. In exchange for their 
freedom and dominion, the infidels were offered the exquisite promise of 
an otherworldly paradise. The natural law right of discovery abided terra 
nullius as its first proposition. Yet it limited the principle’s operative force 
through its second precept: that to be justly seized, land had to be truly 
unoccupied. 
The Australian experience with the principle of terra nullius was 
different. It was terra nullius expanded and unvarnished. Unlike the natural 
law jurists, the Crown did not insist that land be actually unoccupied for the 
principle to be operative. The British in Australia expanded it to justify the 
seizure of occupied land if the indigenous inhabitants, through English eyes, 
were so barbarous and low on the scale of civil polity that their cultural 
attachments to land could be wholly disregarded. Unlike the Catholic 
Church, the British further made no pretext of giving terra nullius in this 
enlarged sense the gloss of a just principle. They followed the Church’s 
precedent of disregarding an entire category of indigenous others 
‘discovered’ in foreign lands as ‘no one’ for purposes of land ownership. 
Yet unlike the Church, the Crown pledged nothing in return for the natural 
abundance they confiscated. There was no heavenly covenant of eternal 
salvation. The British offered only displacement, degradation, and 
servitude. Theirs was terra nullius unvarnished: the uncompensated, 
adverse taking of inhabited land on the pretext that its indigenous occupants 
were so lacking in social development and incapable of agency as to 
effectively render their traditional homelands uninhabited and ‘belonging to 
no one.’ 
This enlarged, unvarnished sense of terra nullius that became operative 
in Australia put two propositions into effect. First, it posited that as of 1788, 
the territory of New South Wales was uninhabited and unoccupied for 
purposes of law.297 Second, it assumed that all of the colony’s land had 
thereby vested in the Crown, giving it full legal and beneficial ownership, 
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unaffected by any claims from indigenous inhabitants.298 These were the 
propositions upheld in Brown, Williams, and Cooper v. Stuart. Over time, 
they effectively dispossessed the indigenous populations of Australia from 
nearly all their traditional lands. 
B. Terra Nullius Challenged: Mabo v Queensland 
Terra nullius in the above sense stood largely unquestioned in Australian 
constitutional and property law until the latter third of the twentieth century. 
The first significant challenge to it came in the 1971 case, Milirrpum v 
Nabalco Pty Ltd.299 The case concerned an effort by the native Yirrkala 
people to suspend mining activity in the Gove Peninsula of Australia’s 
Northern Territory. The trial court, the Supreme Court of the Northern 
Territory, allowed the Yirrkala to present evidence about their traditional 
relationship with the land and their native system of law and justice. Justice 
Blackburn found that the evidence revealed –   
a subtle and elaborate system highly adapted to the country in which 
the people led their lives, which provided a stable order of society 
and was remarkably free from the vagaries of personal whim or 
influence. If ever a system could be called “a government of laws, 
and not of men”, it is that shown in the evidence before me.300 
Nonetheless, Blackburn felt constrained by the 1889 Cooper v. Stuart 
precedent.301 Despite contrary evidence, he concluded as a matter of law 
that no communal native title existed under Australian common law.302 
After Milirrpum, the High Court of Australia hinted in a few cases that 
it might review the Crown’s colonial era practice of dismissing all 
suggestion of native title while arrogating to itself full land ownership as 
incident to its sovereignty.303 This culminated in the celebrated 1992 case 
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Island in the Torres Strait.305 He learned in his thirties, while working as a 
laborer at James Cook University, that the land on Murray Island where he 
and generations of his family before him had been born and raised was not 
theirs, but Crown land.306 Mabo resisted this news. He set about educating 
himself on Australian land law and speaking publicly against the legal 
denial of native title.307 In 1982, a legal action was instituted on his behalf.308 
Ten years later and five months after his death, Mabo prevailed.309 
The High Court in Mabo, per Justice Brennan, expressly condemned the 
Crown’s “enlarged notion of terra nullius” for having given a fictional 
license to expropriate indigenous lands.310 Brennan reasoned: “The fiction 
by which the rights and interests of indigenous inhabitants in land were 
treated as non-existent was justified by a policy which has no place in the 
contemporary law of this country.”311 To Brennan, any fair reading of the 
facts substantiated that the Australian continent and its internal islands were 
inhabited in 1788 by hundreds of thousands of indigenous peoples who 
lived under various forms of social organization. “The facts,” he wrote, “ . . 
. do not fit the ‘absence of law’ or ‘barbarian’ theory underpinning the 
colonial reception of the common law of England.”312 That false theory of 
terra nullius “depended on a discriminatory denigration of indigenous 
inhabitants, their social organization and customs.”313 As such, Brennan 
concluded that the time was ripe for the Court to “overrule the existing 
authorities, discarding the distinction between inhabited colonies that were 
terra nullius and those which were not.”314 
Justices Deane and Gaudron agreed with Justice Brennan that it was 
incumbent upon the High Court to reexamine the legal principles by which 
the Crown had justified its expropriation of nearly all traditional aboriginal 
lands. The Justices wrote: 
Inevitably, one is compelled to acknowledge the role played, in the 
dispossession and oppression of the Aborigines, by the two 
propositions that the territory of New South Wales was, in 1788, terra 
nullius in the sense of unoccupied or uninhabited for legal purposes 
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and that full legal and beneficial ownership of all the lands of the 
Colony vested in the Crown, unaffected by any claims of the 
Aboriginal inhabitants.315 
The Justices deplored how these propositions had set in motion the far-
reaching dispossession of aboriginal homelands, calling it “the darkest 
aspect of the history of this nation.”316 They reasoned: “The nation as a 
whole must remain diminished unless and until there is an 
acknowledgement of, and retreat from, those past injustices.”317 
The way that Justices Brennan, Deane, and Gaudron described the 
Australian experience with terra nullius highlights how the form it took 
constitutes a doctrine of discovery distinct from the others. Justices Deane 
and Gaudron stated that the dispossession of the indigenous populations was 
premised on the proposition “that the territory of New South Wales was, in 
1788, terra nullius in the sense of unoccupied or uninhabited for legal 
purposes. . . .” 318 Justice Brennan described the principle as the “fiction by 
which the rights and interests of indigenous inhabitants in land were treated 
as non-existent . . . .”319 This principle was aptly characterized by Brennan 
as a legal fiction. For with full knowledge that the territory of New South 
Wales was occupied by significant populations of indigenous peoples, the 
British pressed ahead with terra nullius hoping that it would legitimize their 
colonial settlement. Terra nullius complied only under the dehumanizing 
pretext that the aboriginal peoples could be dismissed as barbarians 
incapable of legal agency. Dehumanized by the British, they became ‘no 
one’ “for legal purposes,”320 such that their “rights and interests . . .in land 
[could be] treated as non-existent.”321 As applied in Australia, that is, terra 
nullius took on an enlarged form that enabled the British to seize occupied 
land on the fiction that it was ‘land belonging to no one’ in the sense of land 
belonging to people who, for legal purposes, could be treated as non-
existent. 
This enlarged characterization of terra nullius constitutes a legal fiction 
of the most harmful sort. Its underlying premise was the dehumanized 
representation of the legal status of the indigenous Australians during the 
early years of British settlement. As demonstrated by the 1837 report to the 
House of Commons by the Select Committee on Aborigines, the Crown 
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viewed the indigenous Australians as barbarians with little sense of civil 
organization.322 It denied their existence as self-governing indigenous 
populations with meaningful communal attachments to their homelands. 
Because the British could not understand their forms of social organization, 
and because they did not entertain British concepts of land tenure or private 
transferable rights of property, the Crown deemed them woefully backward 
and incapable of having rights and interests in land. The British, that is, 
found the natives’ forms of life inscrutable and conceptually irreconcilable 
with their own forms of governance and dominion. From this, they 
fallaciously inferred that the aboriginals entirely lacked civil polity and 
customary concepts of land ownership. By carving the gulf of cultural 
separation broadly enough, the British thus laid the foundation for the 
enlarged fiction of terra nullius.  
Expanded to justify appropriating land occupied by people who, for 
purposes of law, were treated as non-existent, terra nullius readily embraced 
the indigenous Australians as characterized by the British. That 
characterization, however, was false. Justices Deane and Gaudron in Mabo 
acknowledged that at first contact the British may genuinely have thought 
that the indigenous Australians lacked the capacity for legal agency.323 That 
perception could not have lasted for long, however. The Justices noted that 
as the British settlement of the continent grew and contact between the 
settlers and natives became more regular, the British must have come to 
understand that individual indigenous communities possessed traditional 
entitlements to occupy and use particular areas of land for economic, social, 
and religious purposes to the exclusion of others.324 Evidence in support of 
this supposition is found in a range of official documents from the early 
nineteenth century. For example, a dispatch from the Imperial Colonial 
Office in 1835 directed the South Australian Colonisation Commission to 
avoid selling unexplored territory to settlers, given that the new colony –  
might embrace in its range numerous Tribes of People whose 
Proprietary Title to the Soil we have not the slightest ground for 
disputing. Before his Majesty can be advised to transfer to His 
Subjects, the property in any part of the Land of Australia, He must 
have at least some reasonable assurance that He is not about to 
sanction any act of injustice towards the Aboriginal Natives.325 
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In 1841, James Stephen, then permanent head of the Colonial Office, wrote: 
“It is an important and unexpected fact that these Tribes had proprietary 
rights in the Soil—that is, in particular sections of it which were clearly 
defined and well understood before the occupation of their country.”326 That 
same year, Justice Willis of the Supreme Court of New South Wales 
declared that, “the Aborigines must be considered and dealt with, until some 
further provision be made, as distinct, though dependent tribes governed 
among themselves by their own rude laws and customs.”327 
The enlarged principle of terra nullius that the Crown enforced in 
Australia thus rested on a misrepresentation of the indigenous Australians 
that the British knew was false. Nonetheless, it worked. Terra nullius in its 
enlarged form, though nothing but a legal fiction, effectively gave license 
to the widespread misappropriation of indigenous lands. Yet there was a 
second, equally pernicious side to the false representation. It not only 
enabled the Crown to enlarge terra nullius; it also suppressed the 
application of a British common law principle that should have preserved 
and protected aboriginal dominion. 
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, England recognized a 
principle of common law native title.328 That principle preserved the pre-
existing territorial rights and interests enjoyed by the indigenous 
populations the British encountered worldwide in their colonial ventures. It 
ensured the natives’ continued use, enjoyment, and occupancy of their 
traditional lands. This was accomplished by reference to their own customs 
and traditions. Though recognized by the common law, native title was not 
a common law institution. The common law did not determine the content 
of a recognized native land title; nor could native title be alienated by 
common law processes.329 Rather, as stated in Mabo by Justice Brennan: 
“Native title has its origin in and is given its content by the traditional laws 
acknowledged by and the traditional customs observed by the indigenous 
inhabitants of a territory. The nature and incidents of native title must be 
ascertained . . . by reference to those laws and customs.”330 
The High Court in Mabo noted that, as to the settlement of Australia, the 
rights conferred by common law native title would have been “binding on 
the Crown and a burden on its title,”331 had the indigenous populations not 
 
 
326. Mabo v Queensland [No 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, ¶ 53 (Deane and Gaudron JJ.) (quoting 
COLONIAL OFFICE RECORDS, AUSTRALIAN JOINT COPYING PROJECT, File No. 13/16, Folio 57 (1984)). 
327. R v Bonjon [1841] NSW SupCt 92 (Austl.), reprinted in (1998) 3 AILR 417, 425 (Willis, 
J.). 
328. See Mabo v Queensland, ¶¶ 60–73 (Brennan J); ¶¶ 18–21 (Deane and Gaudron JJ.). 
329. See id. ¶ 65 (Brennan, J.). 
330. See id. ¶ 64. 












been characterized “as people too low in the scale of social organization to 
be acknowledged as possessing rights and interests in land.”332 Justice 
Brennan observed that today this mischaracterization is discredited.333 
Justices Deane and Gaudron agreed, insisting that it is now “beyond real 
doubt or intelligent dispute” that 
[u]nder the laws or customs of the relevant locality, particular tribes 
or clans were [at the time of British settlement] . . . custodians of the 
areas of land from which they derived their sustenance . . . . Their 
laws or customs were elaborate and obligatory. The boundaries of 
their traditional lands were likely to be long-standing and defined. 
The special relationship between a particular tribe or clan and its land 
was recognized by other tribes . . . . In different ways and to varying 
degrees of intensity, they used their homelands for all the purposes 
of their lives: social, ritual, economic. They identified with them in a 
way which transcended common law notions of property or 
possession.334 
Had this reality been acknowledged by the British during the colonial 
era, the enlarged fiction of terra nullius would have been inapposite. 
Moreover, the Crown would not have acquired absolute beneficial 
ownership to all the lands of Australia. Its title would have been “reduced 
or qualified by the burden of the common law native title of the Aboriginal 
tribes and clans to the particular areas of land on which they lived or which 
they used for traditional purposes.”335 The far-reaching dispossession of the 
aboriginal inhabitants that the British   perpetrated thus was achieved by the 
unjust and discriminatory pairing of the fictional license of terra nullius 
with the Crown’s failure to honor its own principle of common law native 
title. That pairing facilitated the systematic misappropriation of lands which 
should have been protected in accordance with traditional native title. In 
overruling 150 years of existing authorities, the High Court in Mabo 
concluded that the combined effect of terra nullius’ fictional license of 
appropriation and the de facto extinction of native title demanded 
reconsideration.336 It held that nearly the entire island of Mer is not Crown 
land, but belongs, consistent with native title, to the Meriam people.337 
Moreover, it struck down the enlarged fiction of terra nullius. Justice 
 
 
332. Id. ¶ 63 (Brennan, J.). 
333. See id. ¶ 38. 
334. Id. ¶ 37 (Deane and Gaudron, JJ.). 
335. Id. ¶ 56. 
336. See id. ¶ 42 (Brennan, J.). 
337. Id. ¶ 97 (1), (2); Order (1), (2). 











Brennan reasoned that terra nullius must be discarded, for “it is imperative 
in today’s world that the common law should neither be nor be seen to be 
frozen in an age of racial discrimination.”338 Justices Deane and Gaudron 
reached the same conclusion, rightly condemning the country’s systematic 
extinction of native title and dispossession of its native peoples as “a 
national legacy of unutterable shame.”339 
C. Distinguishing the Enlarged Fiction of Terra Nullius 
The Australian High Court in Mabo expressly distinguished the 
enlarged, unvarnished notion of terra nullius from Chief Justice Marshall’s 
principle of discovery. Justice Brennan remarked that “the common law of 
this land has still not reached the stage of retreat from injustice” that the 
United States achieved in 1823 with Johnson v. M’Intosh.340 Marshall’s 
principle recognized that the American Indians retained a legal and moral 
right to occupy and use their traditional lands.341 By contrast, the British in 
Australia leaned on the enlarged fiction of terra nullius to deny the 
indigenous Australians any rights or interests in land worthy of recognition 
whatsoever. 
The High Court in Mabo did not differentiate the enlarged form of terra 
nullius from the natural law right of discovery. It could well have. For the 
two discovery doctrines differ greatly. 
In the tradition of natural law, terra nullius served as the first precept in 
the right of discovery. However, it became operative only if land was truly 
unoccupied. When first formulating the right of discovery, Vitoria 
demanded that it extend only to lands genuinely “unoccupied or 
deserted.”342 Grotius likewise argued that, “by the Right of Discovery 
[European nations] can pretend to those Places only which are not 
appropriated.”343 For by natural law and the law of nations, it is unjust to 
“lay Claim to a Place upon the Score of making the first Discovery of it, if 
already inhabited.”344 Gentili agreed. The law of nature, on his account, 
authorizes the “seizure of vacant places . . . since it is the property of no 
one;”345 yet “lands which are not vacant ought not to be taken.”346 Pufendorf 
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similarly averred that “Premier Seisin, or the first Occupancy” of things 
provides the basis for the right of discovery, according to which “[t]itles are 
made to desolate Regions, which no Man ever claim’d.”347  
This natural law conception of terra nullius, with its prohibition against 
laying claim to occupied land, directly contradicts the enlarged form terra 
nullius took in Australia. This is not to ignore the fact that all of the natural 
lawyers except Pufendorf argued that the prohibition against claiming 
inhabited land could be overridden under certain conditions.348 Those 
conditions, however, became operative post facto discovery. They 
principally concerned the rights of Europeans to travel, trade, and use 
common resources. Any infringement of those rights by native populations 
necessarily would occur in the aftermath, or at least independent, of 
‘discovery.’ Even if infringement were to occur contemporaneously with 
discovery—say, if a native tribe denied some seafaring European settlers a 
safe harbor—the natives’ inhospitable act, not the settlers’ ‘discovery,’ 
would be the triggering event for overriding the prohibition. As an event 
logically independent of discovery, the inhospitable act would not have the 
effect of authorizing seizure of the natives’ land on grounds of discovery 
alone. Hence, the conditions that most of the natural lawyers attached to the 
second precept of their right of discovery did not qualify or enlarge the first 
precept of terra nullius. For them, that precept was absolute. It authorized 
laying claim to land on the basis of discovery alone if and only if the land 
was truly unoccupied. 
The only possible link between the natural law right of discovery and the 
enlarged Australian theory of terra nullius comes from the writings of John 
Locke and Emer de Vattel. Locke argued that indigenous lands could be 
seized by individual Europeans, as if unoccupied, if they were “waste 
land.”349 He defined land as “waste” according to whether it was put to 
productive use by European standards—i.e., improved and cultivated for 
agricultural purposes.350 If an indigenous people occupied land in its natural 
state, Locke argued it should “be looked on as waste and might be the 
possession of any other.”351 
Vattel extended this Lockean idea from the individual acquisition of 
private property to territorial claims by European nations under the right of 
discovery. Working from the premise that all people are obligated to 
cultivate land and make it productive, he argued that “scanty population[s]” 
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of natives, who make “no actual and constant use” of a “vast country” which 
they are “incapable of occupying [as a] whole,” do not constitute “a true and 
legal possession.”352 Since such native possession of land is not true and 
legal by the law of nations, Europeans were entitled to appropriate it and 
establish settlements.353 
Justice Brennan in Mabo cited Vattel as providing theoretic support for 
the enlarged notion of terra nullius. He correctly noted that the idea “that 
new territories could be claimed by occupation if the land . . . were left 
uncultivated by the indigenous inhabitants” was a justification for European 
expropriation on the basis of discovery “first advanced by Vattel.”354 
Brennan also discussed some early Australian cases that referred to colonial 
vacant lands as “waste lands.”355 These observations do not establish a 
genuine connection, however, between the enlarged theory of terra nullius 
and the natural law right of discovery. For neither Vattel nor Locke were 
jurists in the natural law tradition. Locke was a political philosopher 
advancing a theory of natural rights. Vattel wrote in the tradition of the law 
of nations or jus gentium as distinct from the jus naturale. While the major 
philosophers who developed the right of discovery—Vitoria, Grotius, 
Gentili, and Pufendorf—were natural lawyers who also wrote on the law of 
nations, Vattel was not. None of those natural lawyers held the position on 
terra nullius that he advanced. Rather, they all insisted that for terra nullius 
to be operative under the right of discovery, land must be genuinely 
unoccupied. Hence, the enlarged notion of terra nullius enforced by the 
British in Australia, while supported philosophically by Vattel and Locke, 
is logically inconsistent with the right of discovery. 
CONCLUSION 
The idea that ‘discovery’ gave European nations just cause to claim 
ownership of unknown foreign lands significantly influenced European 
exploration and colonial expansion from the Middle Ages through the 
nineteenth century. Yet discovery was not a single doctrinal idea. It took 
several forms. The papal doctrine of terra infidelibus sought to justify the 
taking of land occupied by unbelievers to the Christian faith by promising 
the redemption of sins and a glorious afterlife. The natural law right of 
discovery stipulated that unqualified appropriation of discovered land 
extended only to land that was truly unoccupied. It further aimed to 
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establish, consistent with justice and natural rights, the conditions under 
which European sovereigns could claim land inhabited by indigenous 
peoples. The principle of discovery fashioned by Chief Justice John 
Marshall provided a historic account of the European settlement of the 
United States. It was normative and forward-looking only in regard to its 
description of the American Indians’ retained dominion and the processes 
by which the United States could further acquire tribal lands. The expanded 
principle of terra nullius offered a theory intended to justify the 
appropriation of land occupied by indigenous populations whose ways of 
life were mysterious to Europeans. A detestable legal fiction, the principle 
dehumanized indigenous peoples as incapable of legal agency so as to 
legitimize the wide-ranging, uncompensated expropriation of their lands. 
These four doctrines share the idea of discovery. Beyond that, they differ 
significantly. Understanding their distinct forms matters historically and for 
purposes of rectificatory justice. Hence, recognizing that they comprise 
distinct doctrines of discovery is imperative. Felix Cohen fell short in this 
regard. He did not appreciate the multiple and distinct forms the idea of 
discovery took across the centuries and continents of European exploration. 
Instead, he posited the thesis that the right of discovery formulated by 
Vitoria in sixteenth century Spain was carried forth as a settled principle of 
international law into United States federal Indian law through the formative 
decisions of Chief Justice Marshall. That mistaken thesis has become 
generally accepted dogma among scholars discussing federal Indian law. It 
is reflected in the single doctrine of discovery thesis advanced in recent legal 
scholarship. This is unfortunate, for the single doctrine thesis perpetuates a 
narrative that jurisprudential history shows to be false. 
The nations of Europe that explored, conquered, and colonized 
indigenous lands during the age of discovery did not form a cultural 
monolith pursuing a grand plan. Rather, they were independent sovereigns 
guided somewhat by lofty principles, but largely driven by competitive 
ambition, national self-interest, thirst for wealth, and flawed senses of 
cultural superiority. The notion of discovery gave them a shared rhetoric to 
justify their colonial ventures. But that notion came in sundry forms. The 
thesis that the European powers and their colonial successors worked from 
a single doctrinal plan over-simplifies the history of the era and obfuscates 
the manifold ways in which discovery perpetrated injustice. 
Historically, the four doctrines of discovery emerged in different 
centuries. They exerted their principal influence on different continents. Not 
only were they distinct from each other; they evolved over time and in 
certain respects were internally inconsistent. The papal theory of discovery 
viewed infidel rights differently before Innocent IV than after. Though his 
support of infidel rights became Church doctrine by the close of the Council 











of Constance in 1418, papal bulls thereafter viewed European infidels 
differently than those from afar, often refusing to countenance the latter’s 
rights. The natural law right of discovery retained a consistent form from 
Vitoria through Pufendorf; nonetheless, it varied importantly in the practical 
effect of its second precept. With Vattel, it lost all pretense of a just 
principle. Even Chief Justice Marshall’s principle of discovery changed 
from Johnson v. M’Intosh to Worcester v. Georgia. 
How the idea of discovery impacted any particular displaced indigenous 
population thus depends upon which doctrine of discovery the relevant 
colonizing power followed, along with the time, place, and circumstances 
of the dispossession. Without doubt, discovery in all four of its doctrinal 
forms resulted in the devastation of indigenous cultures and the 
misappropriation of their lands. The original sin of colonialism, discovery 
left a legacy of injustice. Yet to give that legacy its true, sordid measure, 
and to give each of its victims their due regard, it is necessary to view 
colonial experiences in historical context, sensitive to factual circumstances 
and mindful of the justificatory terms of conquest employed by the 
colonizing nation. 
The Australian High Court in Mabo rightfully noted that the enlarged 
notion of terra nullius worked injustice on the Aboriginal Australians 
differently than how Chief Justice Marshall’s principle of discovery 
impacted the American Indians. Both continents’ natives were seriously 
wronged. Yet they suffered injustice under different factual circumstances 
and contrasting terms of discovery. Though the injustices each endured 
came mainly from the British Crown and its colonial successors, the patterns 
and motives of British settlement were heterogeneous. The indigenous 
cultures of North America and Australia fell before different settlers’ 
swords. Their lands were lost under dissimilar terms of discovery. 
Acknowledging those differences enhances critical understanding of the 
historical injustices carried out on both continents. 
Beyond historical understanding, carefully attending to the nuanced 
vagaries that separate the discovery doctrines matters for purposes of 
rectificatory justice. The High Court in Mabo understood this. The Justices 
distinguished their country’s enlarged fiction of terra nullius from the 
American principle of discovery in order to lay the groundwork for 
reconsidering the Australian legacy of aboriginal dispossession. They 
recognized that identifying the specific discovery doctrine used by the 
Crown to annul native title for so long was a necessary condition precedent 
to redressing that historical wrong. The Justices also foresaw that their 
decision upholding the Meriam people’s native title land rights would carry 












would follow in Mabo’s wake. Several have.356 The Justices’ extensive 
discussion of terra nullius in Mabo played forward in those cases. For just 
as with the Meriam people, determining whether other indigenous 
Australian tribes or clans should receive long-delayed recognition of native 
title begins with acknowledging its systematic denial under the pretext of 
terra nullius.  
The situation is similar in the United States. Adjudicating American 
Indian land claims or weighing the question of tribal reparations demands 
sensitive attention to the specific idea of discovery from which the 
Europeans and early settlers drew license to appropriate Indian homelands. 
Chief Justice Marshall maintained in Johnson v. M’Intosh and Worcester v. 
Georgia that his principle of discovery accounts historically for how the 
United States came to hold paramount title to those Indian lands. A century 
later, Felix Cohen argued that Marshall’s decisions incorporated Vitoria’s 
right of discovery. That false narrative persists today in the single doctrine 
of discovery thesis where the natural law right of discovery and Marshall’s 
principle are treated as one.357  
Yet Marshall’s principle of discovery and the natural law doctrine differ 
in crucial ways. For one, the Chief Justice’s principle attached to the 
‘discovered’ lands of North America certain concepts peculiar to English 
property law. While reserving the Indians’ right to continued use and 
occupancy of their tribal homelands—a communal property interest on the 
order of a life estate—Marshall claimed for the British and American 
colonists the ultimate interest in fee simple title. He further denied the free 
alienability of the Indians’ retained land rights. The colonial governments 
not only possessed the fee title but also an exclusive right to acquire, by 
purchase or force, those retained interests. 
The natural lawyers did not scrum over the particular forms of property 
ownership that would follow from discovery. They focused instead on the 
cardinal question of whether and under what conditions discovery provided 
just cause to claim indigenous lands. Their answer was clear: European 
nations could justly claim foreign land on the basis of discovery only if the 
land was unoccupied. Lands inhabited by indigenous peoples could be 
claimed only on satisfaction of certain secondary conditions. Discovery by 
itself did not give just or legal cause to appropriate occupied indigenous 
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land. Further, most of the natural lawyers—e.g., Vitoria, Grotius, 
Pufendorf—assumed that the Americas were largely occupied prior to 
European exploration. To them, Chief Justice Marshall’s position that the 
British acquired ultimate title to American Indian lands simply on account 
of discovery would have seemed presumptuous and unlawful.  
This is to say that the natural law right of discovery and Marshall’s 
principle directly contradicted each other over the fundamental question of 
discovery—whether discovery alone provided just cause for European 
sovereigns to lay claim to lands occupied by indigenous peoples. The 
contradiction perhaps explains Marshall’s avoidance of the natural law 
jurists when formulating his principle of discovery. Surely he was familiar 
with their writings and authority. In drafting his opinions in Johnson and 
Worcester, he certainly understood that his discovery principle contravened 
the fundamental precepts of the natural law right of discovery. Nonetheless, 
he asserted that his principle was a “settled doctrine of the law of nations.”358 
The only support he cited for this assertion was Vattel.359 He ignored 
Vitoria, Grotius, Gentili, and Pufendorf, the eminent natural law 
philosophers who not only developed the right of discovery but founded the 
modern law of nations. In relying only on Vattel, Marshall aligned himself 
with a significant jurist. Vattel’s writings arguably were the most influential 
in the tradition of the law of nations during Marshall’s time. But as to the 
right of discovery, Vattel was an outlier.  
Though he affirmed the long-standing natural law position that terra 
nullius comprised the first precept of the right of discovery,360 Vattel 
ignored the second precept which prohibited the taking of inhabited lands 
on discovery. He replaced that general prohibition with the Lockean fiction 
of a natural right to take indigenous lands when, by European standards, 
they were not being used beneficially.361 This philosophic fiction, however, 
was logically inconsistent with the right of discovery. For the Lockean 
natural right to property amounts to a largely unconstrained entitlement for 
individual Europeans to adversely claim inhabited indigenous lands. When 
Vattel converted that private property right into a sovereign power, he 
greatly depreciated the normative force of the right of discovery. For it was 
precisely to gainsay such presumptive, Eurocentric rules of appropriation 
that Vitoria framed that natural law doctrine in the 1530s.  
By the 1820s, natural law jurisprudence had fallen into disfavor. Locke’s 
fictional natural rights to life, liberty, and property by then were ensconced 
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in positive law. Vattel’s writings on the law of nations were high authority. 
Hence, Marshall found it unnecessary to address the natural lawyers’ line 
of argument. British concepts of property gave him a convenient framework 
for appropriating American Indian lands without directly confronting the 
natural law objections to the taking of occupied indigenous lands. 
Diminishing the Indians’ full dominion could be masked behind temporarily 
conceding retained rights of use and occupancy, while reserving the 
paramount fee title for the European settlers. 
If Marshall’s principle of discovery correctly accounts for the United 
States’ territorial acquisitions, then the justificatory terms and the specific 
nature of the wrongs committed in dispossessing the American Indians of 
their tribal inheritances were different than if Vitoria’s right of discovery 
was the operative doctrine. Hence, should the United States ever genuinely 
wish to redress its shameful legacy of native dispossession, it would do well 
to follow the lead of Australia and determine which specific doctrine (or 
doctrines) of discovery enabled its confiscatory settlement. The Australian 
High Court in Mabo understood that general discussion of ‘the doctrine of 
discovery’ does not suffice. For that reason, it detailed how the enlarged 
notion of terra nullius functioned as the discovery doctrine behind 
England’s settlement of the continent.  
The United States’ historical record of native dispossession is more 
complex. Despite Cohen’s groundbreaking work, it remains uncertain how 
far the natural law right of discovery influenced the exploration and 
settlement of North America. It further remains debatable whether Chief 
Justice Marshall’s principle of discovery tells a true story. More historical 
and legal research is needed. It may be that over the long history of 
America’s colonial and frontier settlement—from the ill-fated Roanoke 
Colony in 1585 to the early twentieth century settling of the Alaskan 
frontier—one discovery doctrine, then another was operative. Perhaps even 
the enlarged fiction of terra nullius held commanding influence at certain 
times and places. This is likely, I think, in the displacement of some Alaska 
native communities. What is clear is that injustice cannot be repaired—land 
claims fairly adjudicated, the case for reparations fully made—unless the 
precise terms of the American Indians’ dispossession of their lands are 
understood. For that, general discussion of the doctrine of discovery will not 
do. The distinct doctrines must be parsed in the context of the facts and 
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